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Taxation and Savings —A
Neoclass ical Perspective
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses recent neoclassical analyses of taxation and
savings.Contrary to the popular view that fiscal policy has highly ambiguous
impacts on savings, neoclassical models admit a host of policies with clear and
potentially quite powerful affects on the accumulation of wealth.The paper
considers four fundamental types of fiscal policies and compares their
quantitative affect on savings.The essential elements of these policies
involve inter— and intragenerational redistribution, marginal and intra—
marginal taxation, and the level of government consumption.Conventional
accountingmeasures of "taxes",spending!, and "deficits" provide, at best,
little guide to changes in underlying fiscal instruments and, at worst, pre-
cisely oppositeindicators of the direction of such changes.Indeed, the con-
tinued use of and concern with conventional fiscal measures is symptomatic of
widespread fiscal illusion.These points are developed within the context of
certainty models.The paper also considers the role of fiscal policy in both
mitigating and exacerbating economic risks facing the private sector.Since
precaution is a major motivation for saving, governments can greatly influence
wealth accumulation either by using fiscal policy to pool private risks or by







The ability of governments to alter an econon"s rate of wealth accumula-
tion is a question that has intrigued economists since the inception of the
discipline.Recently the issue has received considerable attention from
researchers puzzled by historically low U.S. saving rates and dramatic dif-
ferences in saving rates anross industrialized countries.While no consensus on
the appropriate ndel of saving behavior has been reached, investigation of
tax policy within a variety of neoclassical nxdels suggests that governments can
significantly influence the accrual of national wealth.This assessment of the
current state of knowledge about neoclassical savings behavior and government
policy differs markedly from a view, still accepted in many circles, that tax
policywithin the standard economic paradigm has highly ambiguous impacts on
wealth accumulation.The ambiguity is associated with allegedly opposing income
andsubstitution effects arising from changes in tax rates, in particular, capi-
tal income tax rates.While this allegation is true for a subset of tax
changes, neoclassical ndels admit a host of policies with clear and potentially
quite powerful affects on national savings.
"Structural" tax changes provide an important example of such effective
policies.They aredefinedhere as changes in either the tax base or the
progressivity of the rate structure used to generate a given time path of
receipts while holding the time path of government consumption fixed.Holding
constant the time path of receipts provides a prescription for setting tax rates
through time.A key feature of these policies is that they "compensate" the
private sector for imposing a new tax by removing an old one.Since these poli——2—
cies involve no changes in the timing and level of the government's direct
absorption of resources, they leave unchanged the private sector's intertemporal
consumption and leisure possibilityfrontier.1If it so chooses the private
sector can consume as much and work as little in the new tax regime as it does
in the old.Such a response clearly leaves the private sector with the same
collective resources to finance its own as well as the government's unaltered
time path of consumption.The private sector will, however, generally respond
to new tax regimes by choosing a different point on its bidget frontier.The
movement along this intertemporal frontier and its associated changes through
time in savings and labor supply are determined by unambiguous substitution
effects and, potentially, income effects.Although there is no aggregate change
in income for the private sector, since its possibility frontier has not
changed, structural tax changes typically redistribute resources across and
within generations.However, for iny structural tax policies the net income
effects of this redistribution reinforce the substitution effects in raising or
lowering savings.
The distinction between compensated and uncompensated policy changes is
clarified by considering the government's intertemporal budget constraint.
Excluding the possibility that government debt can grow indefinitely at a faster
rate than that of the econon, this constraint requires governments to equate
the present value of receipts, inclusive of base money creation, to the present
value of expenditures, inclusive of interest and principal parments on net
government debt.While restricting the set of policies, including structural
tax policies, that can be used over time to alter wealth formation, the—3—
government'slong term budget is consistent with a wide range of shortand
medium term policies.In particular, the government can permitdebtto grow for
a long time at a faster rate than the econoitry,although indefinite use of this
policy is not feasible.2
In addition to Structural Tax Policy, the government'sintertemporal budget
constraint suggests three other classes of policies for organizing adiscussion
of taxation and saving.These are:
Tax—financed Changes in Government Consumption——
changes in the time path of government consumption that are
contemporaneously financed by adjustments in tax rates of a
particular tax base.
Intergenerational Tax Policy——
reduced taxation of particular cohorts financed by increased
taxation of other cohorts, holding constant the tax base and
the time path of government consumption.In contrast to
structural tax policy, this rule for setting tax rates involves
changes in the time path of total annual tax receipts since
total annnual tax receipts need not equal annual government
consumption.
Intragenerational Tax Policy——
reduced taxation of particular members of a cohort contem—
poraneously financed by increased taxation of other members
of that cohort.In contrast to broad structural changes in
either the tax base or tax progressivity which are not cohort—_14
specific and, consequently, redistribute intergenerationally,
these cohort—specific policies involve only intragenerational
redistribution.
Analysis of these four classes of policies provides insight into the economic im-
pacts of the essentially unlimited broader combination of these and other policies.
This survey is limited to the savings effects of fiscal policy in "full
employment" neoclassical models, assuming, in most of the discussion, well func-
tioning capital markets.The emphasis on "full—employment" neoclassical models
may be justified by the secular, rather than cyclical nature ofthe subject.In
addition, the very significant new body of literature based on such models pro-
vides more than enough material for a single survey.Finally, much of the popu-
lar discussion concerning the behavior of savings and related variables over the
cycle invokes these models, although not always validly.
Section II provides background information for the subsequent discussion;
it describes long—term trends in U.S. saving rates and domestic investment
rates.Striking differences in postwar saving behavior among industrialized
nations are also documented.This historical and international evidence provi-
des a healthy perspective on the issue of taxation and saving.Few would argue
that long—term trends in U.S. saving rates and the current low rate of U.S.
saving relative to those of our principal trading partners are due solely, or
even primarily, to differences in fiscal environments.Government policy is a
significant determinant of national savings, but it is only one of several
important forces at play.Other critical factors that jointly influence savings
are intertemporal preferences, demographics, existing technolor and the rateof—5—
technicalchange, patterns of human capital formation, the extent of market and
intra—fainily lending, and the degree of market and intra—family risk—pooling.
Each of the four stylized policies is considered sequentially in Sections 14
through T.Theirexamination raises a numbe of traditional topics including the
impact of government debt on national savings, the extent to which government
consumption substitutes for private consumption, the distinction between invest-
ment and savings incentives, the savings impact of progressive taxation, the
relationship between human and physical capital ajcumulation the degree to
which borrowing constraints alter the analysis, and the welfare implications of
alternative tax structures.The discussion in these sections, which takes up a
large portion of this article, ignores issues of uncertainty.Many important
and interesting insights can be obtained by working with ixidels of certainty.
The introduction of uncertainty, in some cases, obscures these insights.In
addition, many of the results from certainty models carry over to ndels with
uncertainty.In general, certainty models provide a benchmark for examining
current policies in nore realistic settings in which tastes, technologies, and
indeed future government behavior is uncertain.
Analysis of the four classes of policies as constrained by the government's
long term budget makes it clear that the fundamentals of fiscal policy are not
aggregate"taxes","spending", and "deficits", rather they are changes in margi-
nal incentives,intra—marginal redistribution across and within generations, and
direct government consumption.Section III examines government and private
intertemporal budget constraints for purposes of precisely defining the policies
considered in Sections IV through VII.The main objective of Section III is,—6—
however,to identi the government'sunderlying policy instruments and to
caution the reader that officialaccounting definitions of taxes,expenditures,
and debt provide little guide tothe underlying fiscal structure.On the
contrary, our proclivity to discusssuch issues as savings and governmentpolicy
in terms of this conventionalnomenclature is symptomatic of widespreadfiscal
illusion.To drive home this point, SectionIII demonstrates how identical
fiscal policies can be conductedwith the government reportingessentially any
level of taxes, spending, anddeficits that it desires.Describing fiscal
policy in terms of its effects onmarginal incentives, intramarginaltransfers,
and direct absorption of resourcesrequires changes in vocabulary and
accounting, but a new fiscal languageis necessary to discuss consistentlythe
savings impact of our plethora offiscal policies, all of which ultimately
involve these basic elements.A key feature of the new fiscallanguage should
be descriptions of the lifetimebudget constraints of a small set of represen-
tative households as well asdescriptions of the fundamental fiscalinstruments
that affect these constraints.Household budget constraints depend only onnet
marginal prices and net intramarginalendowments.Since the calculation of
these prices and endowments arefree of accounting conventions, aset of repre-
sentative budget constraints wouldprovide a coherent basis foranalyzing the
changes in and the consequences of alarge variety of fiscal policies.
Section VIII addresses the impact oftaxation on savings in uncertain
environments.A series of contributions(Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave,
l941; James Tobin, 1957;JanMossin, 1968; Peter Diamond, 1977;JamesMirrlees,
19714;Diamondand Mirrlees, 1978; Martin Bailey,1978; Steven Shavell and—7—
LaurenceWeiss, 1979; Hal Varian, 1980;RogerGordon, 1981;Alan Auerbach, 1981;
Jerenv Bulow and Lawrence Summers, 1982; Jonathan Eaton and Harvey Rosen, 1980;
Robert Merton, 1981) expressly or by implication suggest that a variety of
tax/transfer schemes constitute implicit insurance markets.To the extent that
private provision of insurance is both available at the margin and is as effi-
cient as government insurance, the government's pooling of risks through the
tax/expenditure system will have few or no implications either for risk—pooling
or for national saving.At the opposite extreme one could imagine that, in the
absence of government insurance, particular risks would be pooled neither in
formal private markets nor in informal family settings.In this case the effect
of government taxation on savings is analyzed by simply considering the impact
of the availability of each particular type of insurance on national savings.
Section VIII describes the potential insurance properties of a number of
fiscal policies including capital and labor income taxation, and Social
Security's unfunded tax/benefit provisions.Unfortunately, there are few stu-
dies that directly compare wealth accumulation with and without particular forms
of insurance.Section VIII, as a consequence, draws inferences about taxation,
insurance, and savings that are rather speculative in nature.These types of
comparisons certainly represent a promising area for future research.
The government as a cause of uncertainty, rather than a source of
insurance, is an alternative possibility explored briefly in Section VIII.In
principle the private sector could self—insure against random government
redistribution ang current generations.Capricious redistribution between
currentand future generations is also potentially insurable assuming interge——8—
nerationalaltruism as in Robert Barro (19Th).Withoutsuch private insurance,
the impact on savings of government imposed uncertainty is again determined by
comparing economies with and without the particular risks generated by the
government.
The final section plays devil's advocate to Sections IV through VII, by
presenting a set of conditions under which government policy, regardless of
type, has no effect whatsoever on national saving.The conditions required are
extreme and reveal the improbability of such behavior.But the example also
illustrates the fact that the underlying effective tax schedules influencing
saving may have little or nothing to do with the legislated tax system.The
distinction between effective and legislated tax schedules dates at least from
Tiebout (1956)andunderlies the emerging literature on the "dynamic
inconsistency" of government policy (Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, 1977;
Guillermo Calvo 1978; Stanley Fischer, 1979, Stephen Turnovsky and William
Brock, 1980).Dynamic inconsistency refers to the proposition that, as ongoing
institutions, governments are likely continually to reoptimize their fiscal
choices taking current, but not past circumstances into account.As a result
policies slated today to go into effect in the future will likely be altered by
the government in power in the future.In this sense, the government's actual
actions may be inconsistent with its previously expressed intention.
Research in this area cautions that rational households look at what
governments do, not what governments say.If households understand the
government's objective function, they can potentially deduce the course of
future tax policy independent of the government's current declarations.The—9—
difficultyof ascertaining private beliefsabout future government actions pre-
sents special problems for studyingthe savings impact of current taxpolicy.
Such analysesareclearly sensitive to assumptionsconcerning private beliefs
aboutactual future tax policy.
II.U.S. Savings Behavior —SomeSlized Facts
The net national saving rate is oneof several important indicatorsof a
nation's savings behavior.It records the fraction of annualnet output that
viii be available to support futureconsumption, and is defined as NNP lesspri-
vate and government consumption,C and G, respectively, dividedby NNP.The
first column of Table 1 presents averagesof the annual U.S. net nationalsaving
rate over the five decades prior to1980 and the period 1980 through1982.
Values for NNP, C, and G differsomewhat from those reported in theNational
Income and Product Accounts(NIPA).The ijor difference is thatprivate
spending on consumer durables andgovernment spending on highways, struc-
tures, equipment, other durables,and military hardware are treated as
saving in the present figures.Private consumption excludesexpenditures on
durables, but includes imputed rent onthe stock of durables.Government
consumption excludes purchases of structuresand other durables, but inclu-
des imputed rent on these tangibleassets, Including military assets.NNP
includes imputed rent on consumerdurables and government assets lessdepre-
ciation of theseassets.3The figures in column one arelittle affected by
the treatment of military durablepurchases as investment.For reference
column 2 presents the net nationalsaving rate based on NIPAdefinitions of
the relevant variables.TABLE 1
Indices of U.S. Saving Behavior,
1930—1982





National National Household GovernnaentConsumption
Sample Saving Saving ConsumptionConsumption Out of
Period Rate Rate Rate Rate Disposable NNP
(NIPA Basis) (C/NNP) (G/NNP) (C/NNP-G)
1930—1939 —1.17% —2.86% 87.66% 13.51% 101.149%
19140—1949 10.23% 5.32% 68.35% 21.142% 87.29%
1950—1959 15.60% 8.79% 67.614% 17.02% 81.60%
1960—1969 114.25% 8.71% 65.35% 20.140% 82.09%
1970—1979 11.90% 7.70% 67.10% 21.00% 814.92%
1980—1982 7.014% 5.07% 68.62% 24.35% 90.71%
1:Household consumption, C, equals NIPA personal non durables consump-
tion expenditures plus imputed rent on household durables.Govern—
ment consumption, G, equals NIPA government nondurables consumption
expenditures plus imputed rent on government tangible assets,
including military harthiare.NNP equals NIPA NNP plus imputed rent
on household durables and government tangible assets less depre-
ciation of these assets.—10—
Both sets of figures reveal major variations in the saving rate over the 53
yearperiod.The corrected numbers in column one show a 28 percent reduction in
the average saving rate since 1970 compared with the average rate In the pre-
ceding two decades.The comparable reduction is 19 percent based on the NIPA
definitions of the relevant variables.
Columns 3 and 14 display rates of household and government consumption out
of NNP.At first glance the 7percentagepoint increase in the government con-
sumption rate between the 1950s and early 1980s appears responsible for the
recent dramatic decline in the rate of U.S. saving; household consumption as a
share of NNP increased by only 1 percentage point across these two time inter-
vals.Had this share remained constant, the nation's saving rate would still
have fallen by 21 percent.
A neoclassical perspective suggests, however, that private behavior deter—
mines most if not all of these historical changes in the nation's saving rate.
Consider the following two alternative hypotheses.The first assumes that
government consumption substitutes perfectly for household consumption.In this
case, since household consumption is a marginal choice, the figures in columns 3
and 4indicatethat households, on average, collectively chose to consume 85
percent of NNP in the 1950s and l960s and 89percentof NNP in the 1970s and
early 1980s. NNP, in this case, properly measures annual household disposable
income, since the government is simply engaging in consumption the household
sector would otherwise do on its own.
The second extreme hypothesis is that government consumption provides no
welfare whatsoever to the private sector.As section III points out, under—11—
reasonable assumptions concerning limitations on deficit finance, the private
sector must eventually pay for current government consumption.Hence the amount
of net national product remaining after government consumption, NNP—G,provides
a measure of the private sector's effectiveannual disposable income; this is
true despite the fact thatnettax payments may differ from government consump-
tion in particular years.Column 5examinesthe rate of consumption out of this
definition of annual household disposable net national product.Note that this
consumption rate rose from 82 percent in the 1950s to 91 percent in the early
1980s.Had the post 1969 rate of household consumption out of NNP—G remained at
its 1950—1969 average value, the net national savings rate would have fallen by
5percentrather than 28 percent.This second assumption concerning the substi-
tutability of private and government consumption attributes none of the
increased government consumption to private sector decisions.Hence, from this
perspective, increased government consumption is directly responsible for at
most one fifth of the post 1969 drop in the net national saving rate.
The figures in Table 1 showing considerable variations in national and
household saving propensities may appear surprising in light of what has been
dubbed "Denison's Law."Edward Denison (1958), Bert Hickman (1966), and Paul
David and John Sca.dding (19TI)documentthat the U.S. ratio of gross private
saving to gross national product has been remarkably stable through time.
Without questioning the validity of this proposition, it is well to point out
that gross private saving is the difference between gross national saving and
the NIPA definition of government deficits.As Section III emphasizes, the NIPA
definition of deficits is an entirely arbitrary accounting choice.If one assu——12—
irs that economic behavior depends onreal variables rather than accounting con-
ventions, then the U.S.gross private saving rate is similarly anentirely
arbitrary accounting construct.Had government accountants chosen a quite dif-
ferent definition of deficits, the gross privatesaving rate would have exhi-
bited substantial variation throughtime)Unlike the gross private saving
rate, measurement of the net national saving rateis independent of accounting
conventions that arbitrarily lable particular variables as"private" or
"government"; in addition, assuming no fiscal illusion on the partof economic
agents, the actual rate of net national savingresponds only to economic
variables and not to accounting labels.
Much of the variation in saving rates described inTable 1 may simply
reflect intertemporal consumption smoothing duringperiods of fluctuating net
national product.Figure 1 displays deviations from trend in corrected measures
of private consumption and net national product.Detrended consumption is
clearly a aich smoother series than detrended NNP.This well known fact provi-
des some empirical support for examiningneoclassical models that assume reaso-
nably well functioning capital markets and predictintertemporal consumption
smoothing.
International Comparisons of Saving Rates and InternationalCapital Mobility
For the period 1930 to 1982 the correlation coefficientbetween the U.S.
net national saving rate and the net domesticinvestment rate, defined as the
ratio of the net domestic investment to NNP is .99.Theabsolute discrepancy
between these two rates exceeds 1.5 percentage points inonly bofthe last 53














































































































































































































































































































(1982) of time series andcrosscountry correlations between saving and invest-
ment rates suggestthat policiesgenerating an additional dollar in national
saving increase domestic investment by roughly 85cents.Arnold Harberger
(1980) and Jeffrey Sachs (1981a, 198Th) reject this view, presenting evidence
that nwnerous countries are financing major portions of their domestic invest-
ment through foreign sources.
While the debate on the degree of international capital mobility hasbeen
joined, the issue has not been resolved.Eaton and Mark Gersowitz (1981), and
Michael Dooley and Peter Isard (1980) provide a theoretical foundation for the
Feldstein—Horioka findings based on a perception of potential foreign
expropriation; their models suggest positive net as well as gross intra—marginal
international capital mobility, but little or zero mobility at the margin.The
limited mobility of financial capital at the margin is ascribed to the
increasing probability of expropriation of equity investments and default on
loans as foreign countries absorb greater net amounts of international capitaL.
An alternative explanation of the Feldstein/Horioka findings, that is consistent
with full international capital mobility at the nrgin, is that factor price
equilization eliminates the incentives for international capitalflows.5Given
the unresolved nature of this debate prudence suggests analyzing the savings
impact of domestic fiscal policies in both closed and open economics; as orii—
nally pointed outby Peg Musgrave (1969) and recently examined byLarry
Goulder, John Shoven, and John alley (1983) and Harberger (1983), in open eco-
nomies policies that stimulate domestic investment can be quite different froc
policies that stimulate national saving.The concluding subsection inIII114
briefly points out the nature of these differences.
Whether or not capital is perfectly mobile internationally, cross country
comparisons of saving rates are obvious guides to changes over time in the
international distribution of wealth and in relative standards of living.TabLe
2 compares the net national saving rates of U.S. and other OECD countries based
on newly available OECD data.The OECD concepts of NNP, C, and G are roughly
those used in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts except that govern-
ment consumption, G, excludes expenditures on non—military durables and struc-
tures.
Table 2 provides evidence of persistent and sizeable international dif-
ferences in rates of net national saving and rates of household consumption out
of NNP—G.Since 1960, the U.S. net national saving rate has averaged 55 percent
of the corresponding rate for the European OECD countries, and314 percent of the
Japanese rate.For this period the average U.S. household consumption rate
(C/(NNP—G)) exceeds the corresponding European OECD rate by 8 percentage points
and the Japanese rate by i8 percentage points.
International differences in rates of domestic capital formation and
increases in capital—labor ratios are equally striking.OECD data indicates
that the U.S. net domestic capital stock grew at an average annual rate of 3.6
percent between 1960 and 1982; the comparable figures for France and Germany are
12.3 percent and 10.14 percent, respectively.Over this period U.S. capital per
worker grew on average by 1.5 percent per year compared with 11.6 percent in
France and 10.14 percent in Germany.TABLE 2
Saving and Consumption Rates —InternationalComparisons1
(Average Annual Rates Over Specified Period)
(1)
Government Household
Net National Consumption Consumption
Saving Rate Rate (G/NNP) Rate (C/(CNNP-G))
Out of Disposable NNP
OECD OECD OECD
Period U.S.Europe Japan U.S.EuropeJapan U.S.EuropeJapan
1955—59 9.8 NA 21.5 19.1 NA 10.6 87.9 NA 76.0
1960—69 10.5 17.3 17.0 20.1 15.7 9.14 86.979.8 70.2
1970—79 8.015.1 25.5 20.1 18.5 10.14 89.981.5 70.5
1980—81 5.0 11.021.3 20.9 19.9 11.7 93.686.375.9
1960—81 8.715.725.820.217.310.1 88.981.0 71.3
NA —Notavailable.
1Source:OECD National Accounts, 1952—1981; variables are defined according
to U.N. System of National Accounts (SNA).—15—
III.Government and Private Budget Constraints:A Description of Fundamental
.Policy Instruments
The government, as an institution with potentially unlimited life, is in a
position to borrow from succeeding new generations to meet its liabilities to
existing generations.If the real interest rate paid on such borrowing exceeds
the econorw's rate of population plus productivity growth, a policy of con-
tinually borrowing to meet all interest and principal payments means that
government debt continually grows relative to the size of the econonj.Such a
policy is clearly infeasible; if government creditors demand real resources upon
settlement with the government, all current output plus claims to existing
assets will eventually be insufficient to meet these demands.In an econorw in
which the pre—tax real return paid on government borrowing exceeds the
underlying rate of economic growth, deficit—financed spending ultimately
requires the government to raise real resources either by explicit taxation or
by expropriation through inflation or otherwise of its creditors' nominal
assets.In the long run, these revenues must meet government spending plus the
excess of interest payments on past borrowing over the expansion of debt that
could perpetually be financed by the growth in the economy.The limitation on
debt finance implies the following relationship between the course of taxation,
base money creation, spending on government consumption plus transfer payments,




+D (i) l+r 1+r o t=o t t
Equation (i) expresses the government's intertemporal budget constraint in
terms of conventional fiscal taxonomy.Tt, M, and Et are, respectively, nomi-
nal taxes, base noney creation, and nominal expenditures on consumption andtransfer payments in year t.These flows are discounted at nominal interest
rates, r. that are realized between time zero and t.In a world of certainty,
the rs are given by the term structure of interest rates prevailing at time
zero.D0, the rrket value of net government liabilities at time zero, can
also be witten as the discounted value of interest plus principal repayments.
The budget constraint indicates that 'printing" of high powered nmney is a
source of government revenue; in the U.S. and in mny other countriesgovernment
acquisition of real resources by simply "printing" noney is effected by the
treasury or finance ministry selling bonds to the private sector which the
central bank then purchases with newly created money.Equation Cl) consolidates
the fiscal behavior of these institutions.
The long—run connection between this constraint and the econow's growth
and interest rates is evident in equation (2) which expresses the constraint
when the econonor is in a stationary state in which all real variables are
growing at the rate n and the inflation rate is II:
t +Am=e+Cr—II—n(l+Ii))d (2)
Each of the variables in (2)ismeasured per effective worker.This expression
verifies the proposition that long—run real revenues including base money
creation (t +Am)less spending Ce) must cover real interest payments on debt
(r—ii)d less the additions to the stock of debt that can be financed by economic
growth alone n(l +fl)d.
B.The Fragility of Government Bookkeeping and the Potential for Fiscal
Illusion
Macro economists typically discuss fiscal policy in terms of officially—17—
reportedvalues of "taxes", "spending", and "deficits"."Taxes" in excess of
"spending" is commonly referred to as "tight" fiscal policy, while the converse
isdescribed as "loose" fiscal policy.Unfortunately, the accounting defini-
tionsof "taxes", "spending", and "deficits" are arbitrary, having no counter-
parts in economic theory; in full employment equilibrium models with operative
capital markets,household budget constraints depend on marginal prices and
endowmentsand are independent of accounting conventions with respect to govern-
ment policy.From the perspective of these micro budget constraints, fiscal
policies that are tight are often mislabelled loose and vice versa.The failure
to discuss fiscal policy in terms of household budget constraints raises the
potential for fiscal illusion.
The "pay—as—you—go" financing of the U.S. Social Security System provides
an excellent example of our propensity to engage in fiscal illusion.The Social
Security System represents the Federal government's largest program of interge-
nerational transfers, yet none of what effectively constitutes enormous
borrowing from current and future generations was officially recorded as
"deficits".Recent estimates by Social Security actuaries suggest an unfunded
Social Security liability of 1 to 6trilliondollars owed to the current adult
population.These liabilities, while they are not legally enforceable obliga-
tions and have different risk properties than official debt, swamp estimates of
the government's current official net liabilities.Indeed, official U.S. net
liabilities (D0 above) measured at market value appear to be slightly negative
(the government's official net worth is positive), reflecting considerable
federal holdings of financial and tangible assets and sizeable capital gains on—18—
nominalgovernment liabilities accrued during the 1970s (Robert Eisner and Paul
Piper, 1983; 1982 Economic Report of the President, Chapters 4and5).
Historically,the government could have made its hidden annual Social
Security"deficits" explicit by simply handing each Social Security taxpayer a
piece ofpaper indicating his or her projected claim to additional future bene-
fits "purchased" with his or her annual payment of Social Security "taxes".Had
the government recorded Social Security "taxes" as payments for Social Security
bonds, the government would have reported deficits, inclusive of these bond
issues, in excess of $300 billion dollars in several of the last20years, and
deficits in excess of $100 billion dollars in nst of the last 20 years.One
imagines that this alternative tally of govermnent indebtedness would have
engendered very different estimates of concepts such as "the full employment
deficit" and would have led to an array of quite different econometric findings.
Economists, insensitive to the problem of' fiscal illusion, maywellhave reached
very different conclusions about the degree of fiscal stimulus.
Presumably, such a redefinition of official government liabilities would
raise the question of classifying other implicit commitments to future expen-
ditures as governmentdebt.6If one is willing to label implicit promises to pay
future retirement benefits official liabilities, why not include implicit expen-
diture commitments to maintain the national parks, to defend the country, or to
provide minimum sustenance to the poor?
A heated debate about the appropriate definition of' government debt would
likely lead some exasperated officials to suggest eliminating deficit financing
entirely and simply relying on taxation.These officials might also argue that one—19-
could.switch from "deficit" to taxt finance with no effect whatsoever on the
economy.Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, they would be quite
correct.Rather than raise additional funds by issuing treasury securities, the
government could simply levy a head "tax" per adult promising to provide each
adult in the following year a tax credit equal to the tax plus interest on the
tax.If the adult died during the year, the payment would be made to his or her
estate.Those too poor to pay the head tax could borrow against next year's
tax credit to obtain the required funds.The equality, in present value, bet-
ween each household's head tax and its head tax credit, leaves household budgets
and, therefore, private behavior unaltered.However, since future tax credits,
like future Social Security benefit payments, are not recorded in the current
budget, this policy permits the government to report a smaller deficit.
An analysis of (1) indicates nre precisely how shrewd accounting can
eliminate the reporting of deficits without changing any real policy.Define a
sequence of head taxes, Tt, that may be negative or positive, but that sum in




TtE -(Tt+M)for t >0.
Condition (14) follows imndiately from (i) and (3).
t
0 (14) l+r





t=0 t t=0 t
and for all t >0,
T +AM=E. (6)
Accordingto (6)thegovernment can now report zero debt and zero deficit
in every year in the future, while running exactly the same policy.The trick
in going from (1) to (6)issimply to have the government label private sector
loans to the government positive "taxes" and to classify government loan
repayments as negative "taxes".
Starting from (6)thegovernment could further modify its accounting prac-
tices and start reporting enormous "surpluses", although it again engages in no
real policy change.The me here involves the government imposing additional
positive head taxes, and positive head transfer payments, t+l' related by:
(l+rt)
T —Et+i(i +
Provided the "tax" payers at t are the "transfer" recipients at t+l, this policy
has no effect on household budget constraints.The official "surplus" (a stock)
at time t, S,, for t >0is now reported as:—21--
(1+rt) = ** = — S=St_i(1 +rt_i)
+T+Tt+ — Et --Et=, (8)
= (1+rt) **
since =St_i(1 +rY
by construction, and Tt+ — Etequals zero from
(6).Thegovernment can potentially make and, therefore, its reported
surplus at time t as large as the econorry's stock of wealth at timet.T
The fact that economic theory does not distinguish positive "taxes" or
negative "spending" from government "borrowing" and positive "spending" or nega-
tive"taxes" from government "debt service" potentially permits the government
toreport essentially any level of debt and deficits it wantswithout affecting
theeconoiir,,.In addition to this freedom to manipulate the reporting of
"deficits", the government has essentially unlimited flexibility in altering the
size of reported "taxes" and "spending" given the level of "deficits" it chooses
to report.The government, could, for example, declare a new set of taxes,
and transfers, Et, of equal value.Assuming that households paying these
additional "taxes" receive an identical amount back in the form of additional
"spending" and that any changes in marginal incentives (prices) associated with
the new "taxes" are exactly offset by changes in marginal incentives (prices)
associated with the new "spending", economic activity will remain unchanged.
Reducing the "size" of government taxes and spending with no real consequences
is also in the power of government bookkeepers.
Between 1960 and 1983, U.S. Federal spending on transfer payments,
including grants in—aid to State and Local Governments, rose from 6percentto
14 percent of GNP, leading many to praise, many to decry, and others to study
the "growth" in government.The bulk of Federal transfer payments, 15percent,—22-.
are direct payments to individuals; most Federal transfers to state and local
governments are ultimately paid to individuals in the form of medical, housing
and general welfare support.
In principle, the Federal government could have incorporated all post—war
transfer payments within the tax code in the form of special tax credits and
deductions.Hadthegovernment imbedded this "growth" in spending in the tax
code as additional "tax expenditures", a term coined by Stanley Surrey (1973),
and adopted in the Congressional Budget Act of l974, reported Federal spending
would simply have consisted of consumption.Federal consumption, excluding
purchases of durable goods, but including imputed rent on government assets,
fell as a fraction of NNP in the post—war period from 10 percent in the 1950s to
8percentin the 1982.One presumes that this manner of displaying economic
reality would have led many of those who now praise, decry, and study the growth
in government, to decry, praise, and study its decline.
The point here is certainly not to claim that there were no economic
effects from the post war rise in reported transfer payments.These policies
were associated with significant changes in the intertemporal budget constraints
of virtually all American households.The point is that the size and character
of the effects of fiscal policy cannot be judged from the size of "taxes,"
"deficits," etc, because these accounting entries can vary widely without having
any affect whatsoever on economic activity.Discussing fiscal policy and
savings without engaging in fiscal illusion requires identifying the
government's fundamental policy instruments including those that have a
direct impact on the econon' and those that indirectly affect the econonrj by
altering household budget constaints.—23—
C.Real Versus Illusory Fiscal Policy
Equation (9)representsa final rewriting of equation (1) that con-
veniently illuminates the government's fundamental policy instruments.This
description of the government's budget uses the fact that the government's
initial net liabilities, may be expressed as the present value of net interest
plus principal payments on D0.In (9)allgovernment outlays including
interest and principal payments on D0, but excluding consumption outlays, Gt,
are incorporated in the tax code.The"taxcode treats all such outlays as
either refundable tax credits or deductions, specifying, where necessary, the
names of particular households in society receiving these payments.All house-
holds that are alive or will be alive are referenced by the index j.Obviously,
the Ts are zero for years prior to and after the households are in economic
existence.
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Transforming all non—consumption outlays into equivalent "tax expenditures"
permits one to focus directly on net lump sum and net marginal taxation of
households; i.e., each T term equals a net (positive or negative) lump sum
tax imposed in year t on households j, plus year t, household jtaxschedules
applied to corresponding year t, household jtaxbases.8
In the U.S., earnings—and incomes—tested welfare and social insurance
programs significantly alter marginal incentives to work and save.By adding
this implicit net tax schedule to other explicit federal, state and local tax
schedules, thecode identifies the ultimate effective tax structurefacing
each household.Piercing the "welfare veil" of taxation under the tax code—2 1
reveals that "negative income taxation" is already a reality in the U.S.,
although the negative income tax schedulesconfronting U.S. households differ
greatly from those thathavebeen proposed (Milton Friedman, 1962); current U.S.
negative income tax schedules are categorical, depending on the household's
demographic composition, and often exhibit extraordinarily high marginal tax
rates on labor supplyat low earnings levels.Thetax code should also be
understoodas piercing the "corporate veil", taking account of both corporate
and personaltaxation and subsidization, (e.g., investment incentives) of the
return to capital in describing the government's net influence on the tradeoff
between current and future consumption andleisure.9
Since household preferences and budget constraints are, by assumption, the
sole determinants of household consumption and labor supplydecisions,govern-
ment policy involving choices of the terms T,, and Gt alter private beha-
vior only by changing the after—tax prices and after—tax endowments appearing in
household intertemporal budgets.The government's fundamental policy instru-
ments are thus its choices of Mt, Gt, its effective net marginal tax scheduLes,
and its net intraxnarginal taxation.
D.Marginal Taxation and Human Capital Formation
The government's effective rginal tax schedules affect household budgets
in three ways.First, they change after—tax prices between current and future
values of consumption and leisure.Second, they change the present value of
households' resource endowments, including their human and nonhuman wealth.
Third, they change incentives to accumulate human capital, which, in turn,
alters the household's time path of pre—tax wage rates.Research on fiscal—25--
policy and savings has focused trost closely on the firsttwo channels by which
government marginal taxation affects household behavior.Michael Boskin's
(1975)articleon taxation and human capitalformation is a notable exception.
Under the assumption that time spent in training andrelated activities is the
only input into human capital formation, Boskin showedthat a proportional labor
tax has no distorting affect on the human capital investmentdecision; the pro-
portional labor tax reduces the opportunity cost of humancapital accumulation
(i.e., it reduces the size of net foregoneearnings) while also reducing the
return from the investment paid in the form of futureafter tax wages.The
additional incentive to invest in human capital is exactly offset(in present
value) by the additional disincentive in the case of proportional labor taxa-
tion.
Boskin further clarified the net disincentive to human capitalformation
under progressive taxation of labor income or underproportional taxation,
assuming that additional inputs are required for this investmentand that
expensing of these inputs is not permitted.Subsequent articles by James
Heckman (1976) and Kotlikoff and Summers(1979) stressed the incentive to human
capital formation arising from capital income taxation;higher capital income
tax rates mean lower after tax rates of return andlarger discountedvalues of
the future returns from human capital investment.
In neoclassical nodels with no uncertainty and noborrowing constraints
the timing of household consumption decisions is notcontingent on the timing of
the receipt of labor earnings.Hence, more human capital investment means less
current labor supply, less current output, as conventionallymeasured, and, with—26—
household consumption not directly reduced, less conventional saving.In addi-
tion, if consumption goods, such as educational services, are used in human
capital investment, the expansion of such investment directly increases consump-
tion of this type, further lowering current saving.A corollary to this point
is that tax incentives that promote human capital formation typically do so at
the cost of less non—human capital formation.In the case of capital income
taxation, incentives for greater current human capital formation (smaller
current labor earnings) reinforce incentives to substitute current for future
consumption in discouraging non—human wealth accumulation (Kotlikoff and Summers
(1979)).
Whileadditional investigation of the tradeoffs between human and non—human
capital formation is needed, it appears unlikely that realistic modeling of
these interactions would greatly affect many of the findings about taxation and
non—human capital formation described below.
E.Structural Tax Policy
Household budget constaints, like that of the government, can be rewritten
in multiple ways.In particular, quantities can be multiplied by either before—
tax or after—tax prices, with additional terms appearing in the eipression that
uses before—tax prices.The conventional formulation multiplies quantities by
after—tax prices, since households are presumed to consider after—tax prices in
making economic choices.In the standard expression the present after—tax pri-
ces of current and future consumption incorporate consumption and capital
income tax rates, while the present after—tax prices of current and future
leisure incorporate labor and capital income tax rates.Structural tax policy—21—
involves changes in tax rates and, therefore, changes inrelative prices of
current and future consumption and leisure.The requirement that the new tax
code generate the same time path of receipts as the code itreplaces provides a
rule for setting net tax rates through time.Such changes in tax bases or the
rate structure under a given tax base leave unchanged the privateeconomy's
intertemporal possibilities frontier, although they typically induce different
choices of points on thatfrontier.1°
While each household, acting independently, perceives that its budget has
been changed by structural policy, the private sector as awhole ultimately
operates with the same budget; i.e., it experiences no aggregate changein
income.To see this consider equation (10) that presents the aggregate(private
plus government) economy's intertemporal budget constraint.In (10) Z equals
expenditures in year t by household jonleisure and consumption goods,
including imputed rent on consumer durables and rney holdings.Ho and Ao are,
respectively, human wealth (the present value of laborearnings) and the market
value of non—human wealth of the economy at time zero.All terms in (10) are
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The right—hand side of (10) indicates the total present value of theeconomy's
current and future resources available to finance the present valueof govern—
ment consumption and private purchases of consumption goods andleisure, the—28—
firstterm on the left side of (10).
For a given time path of Gt, (10) corresponds to the private econonrf's
intertemporal budget, i.e., the resources available for private consumption and
leisure are the econolw's total resource endowment, Ho +Ao,less the governmentts
Gt
claim on that endowment,
i+r Hence,one feasible response to the
t=o t
government's switching tax bases or altering the rate structures of prevailing
tax bases is that private behavior as well as all before tax prices (including
the rt's) remain unaltered.Changes in the tax structure in the presence of
unchanged private behavior and before tax prices implies, of course, changes in
some if not all the T's,but, according to (9)thesenew taxes plus base
money creation must still equal, in present value, the present value ofgovern-
ment consumption.From (io),then,the econonw's resources remaining for pri-
vate expenditures on consumption and leisure are unaltered.Stated differently,
ifrealprivate sector behavior and the Gt'S remain unchanged, the government
willbe forced to choose tax rates under the new tax structure that are con-
sistent with (9)forunchanged valuesof both the rt's, the 1M,'sand the
's.
If the private sector consisted of a single, infinitely—lived household, one
would expect that household to understand the aggregate econo's budget
constraint (io).Sucha rational household would know it had to pay for the
govermnentts time path of consumption regardless of what tax system was being
used to collect the resources; more precisely, it would know that changes in its
behavior would automatically lead to changes in tax rates.A single household
would, therefore, internalize the gverneflt$ budget constraint andtreat—29—
taxes, no matter how they were imposed, as lump sum levies.In such a setting
structural tax changes would have no effect whatsoever.However, in the case of
a large number of households, none ofwhom pay more than a trivial fraction of
total taxes, the assumption that no single household considers thefeed-
back of its behavior on government tax rates is more appealing.Under this
Cournot—Nash assumption each household attempts to "free ride" on the tax
payments of other households by altering its behavior in response to changesin
tax incentives.In partial equilbrium, i.e. ,holdingconstant before tax pri-
ces, including the rt's, (9)and(10) indicate that the new values of private
consumption and leisure (summarized by afterthe private sector responds
to the new tax structure, lie on the private econoIij's originalbudget frontier.
Thus, structural tax changes, in partial equilibrium, produce compensated
changes in behavior of the type described by Harberger(l961) and Diamond
(1970).These compensated changes along the initial budget frontier, likeJohn
Hick's (1912) compensation around an initial indifference surface, are unam-
biguous in sign.
Figure 2 illustrates this type of partial equilibrium compensated change
for a consumer who chooses consumption over two periods, C1 and C2,based on an
exogeneous initial endowment, E1.The government taxes the consumer to finance
its consumption which has a present v1ue of G1.The slopes of lines 1 and 2
equal 1 +rwhere r is the before tax interest rate.The slope of line 3 is
where Tr is the capital income tax rate.Point A is the equilibrium
under lump sum taxation, while point B corresponds to the equilibriumunder a
capital income tax structure.The government collects the same present value,—30—
G1,in taxes under both tax structures, and private consumption occurs along the
same budget frontier, line2;l2the increase in capital income taxation is com-
pensated by a decline in lump sum taxation permitting the consumer to end up
consuming on his initial budget frontier.Assuming smooth convex indifference
curves, private consumption in period 1 unambiguously rises from C1 to C1 .Note
that if the private sector had naintained its initial consumption bundle, the
government's capital income tax rate would have been lower by the difference in
the slopes of lines 3 and 14dividedby r.
Figure 2 can be used to describe the impact on national savings of a
structural shift from lump sum to capital income taxation.Since structural
tax policy, as here defined, leaves unaltered the time path of government reve-
nues, the lump sum tax, like the capital income tax, is assumed tobe levied in
period two.The post—tax endowment point in figure 2 is thus E1' under the lump
sum tax and under the capital income tax.
In a simple two period overlapping generations life cycle nDdel(Franco
Modigliani and Richard Brumberg, 19514; Albert Ando and Modigliani,1963), each
generation lives for exactly two periods.The young generation in this model
has no initial wealth and all private wealth is held by the old generation.The
wealth of the old generation, in turn, corresponds to the savings accumulatedby
the old generation when it was young.Letting W1 stand for the private wealth
of the old generation accumulated during its first period and lettingWg denote
government wealth, then National Wealth W is given by: W =Wg+W1J3In
termsof figure 2,W1 under lump sum taxation equalsE1—C1,since is
firstperiod income, andisfirstperiod consumption.The period to period






total private consumption.By assumption government consumption is fixed; hence,
currentchanges in national saving depend only on changes in private
consumption.
Consider an announcement at timetthatthegovernment willpermanently
switch to capital income taxation starting at time t+1.Such a policy has no
impacton the consumption of the elderly at time t, since they still face the
lump sum tax in period t and do not survive to period t+l.The young at time
t, however, increase their consumption according to figure 2 by C1—C1,which
corresponds precisely to the partial equilibrium reduction in national wealth.
This savings reduction is permanent because all successive, young generations
face the same budget constraint, line in the diagram, and save —C1
rather than —C1.In this example, the change in national savings is unam—
bigious in sign.This compensated tax change involves only substitution
effects; the change in income for the private sector in tote and for each age
cohort iszero.1
An example of a structural tax policy in which income effects also arise is
an immediate switch from proportional capital income to consumption taxation.
While the government collects the same total revenue each period inder the new
tax structure, as Summers (1981) recently emphasized, such a policy typically
alters the taxes collected from each cohort.In particular, the tax extracted
from the elderly at the time the change is introduced is likely to be
substantially in excess of their tax liability under the capital income tax.
Since, as implied by (9),thepresent value of all future taxes remains
unchanged, the greater tax burden on the initial elderly implies a smaller
lifetime tax burden on young and/or future generations.This redistribution
away from the elderly reinforces the substitution effects of the tax policy in—32—
lowering current consumption and stimulating current saving; while the larger
tax burden imposed on the initial elderly means a smaller burden onthe initial
young, the elderly, in life cycle laDdeis, have largermarginal propensities to
consume than the young.In addition the associated reduction in tax burdens for
future generations obviously has no affect on current consumption.The larger
consumption propensities of the elderly than the young in a strict life cycle
model simply reflect their shorter life expectancies and their absence of a
bequest motive.
To sumnarize, structural tax policies leave the private sector's aggregate
income unchanged, but they produce unambiguous substitution effects and income
effects may, on net, reinforce the substitution effects.
E.Tax—financed changes in Government Consumption
In contrast to structural tax policy, contemporaneous tax—financed changes
in government consumption can produce aggregate changes in income for
the private sector. Assume government consumption does not enter private utility
functions; then permanent increases or reductions in government consumption
require permanent increases on reductions in taxes to finance such changes in
government consumption15.If the government is using distortionary taxation, the
required changes in tax rates produce a rotation of the private intertemporal
budget reflecting government induced changes in private after—tax relative
prices.As an example consider how private consumption is altered when both
government consumption and the capital income taxation used to finance that con-
sumption are eliminated.For the initial elderly generation alive in the period
the new policy is first implemented the change provides a windfall gainequal—33—
to the capital income taxes it would otherwise have paid.Since the old are in
the last period of their life and have no bequest rwtive, they immediately con-
sume the entire amount of the windfall.But since government consumption, by
assumption, had exactly equaled capital income tax revenues, the reduction in
government consumption in the first peroid of the policy is exactly offset by an
equal increase in the consumption of the initial elderly.Hence, the policy's
initial period affect on total national consumption and, therefore, initial
period total national saving, depends on the consumption of the young in the
initial period.The impact on the consumption of the young at the time the
policy is implemented is ambiguous.For the young the elimination of capital
income taxation serves to rotate their lifetime budget from line14 to line 1 in
figure 2.The initial period change in national consumption (which equals the
change in national saving) has, in this case, the opposite sign as the uncompen—
sated elasticity of first period consumption (consumption of the current period
young) with respect to the interest rate.Thus, this is a question about tax
policy and saving to which a particular "interest elasticity" by itself provides
useful information, but this is a very special type of policy experiment
imbedded in one very simple neoclassical nrdel.
Unfortunately, much research effort (Harberger, 19614; Feldstein, 1978;
Wright, 1969; Warren Weber, 1970, 1975;AlanBlinder 1975; Boskin, 1978; Philip
Howrey and Saul Hymans, 1978; Summers, 1981, 1982; Owen Evans, 1983;
David Starrett, 1983); has focused on defining and measuring "the interest
elasticity of saving" suggesting that a single number could provide a summary
statistic for the effects of a wide range of government policies.Such is not_3J
the case.
According to the government's budget constraint, exogenous changes in the
return to saving arising from changes in capital income tax rates
necessarily require some offsetting adjustment in current and/or future
fiscal instruments.Changes in the course of government consumption is only one
of many possible adjustments to changes in capital income taxation that would
restore balance to the government's intertemporal budget.Suppose, for example,
that the cut in capital income tax rates is temporary; in this case the fiscal
adjustment might take the form of higher future capital income tax rates.
Exactly which policy instrument or set of instruments is used to satisfy (9)
andthe timing of their use is critically important for determining the response
of current national saving to a current reduction in capital income taxation.
Thus "the interest elasticity" of current saving will be one number if the tax
cut is expected to last one year, it will be a different number if the tax cut
is expected to last 10 years, and it will be a still different number if the tax
cut is expected to last 20 years.Furthermore, the percentage response of
national saving to a tax cut depends on whether the tax cut is financed by
reduced government consumption, concomitant increases in other tax rates, or
future increases in other tax rates.Neither the sign nor the absolute magni-
tude of the change in saving can be determined without specifying precisely what
policies will accommodate a current reduction in capital income tax rates.
The time series regression analyses of private consumption decisions
referenced above do not include variables capturing the future time path of acco—
modating fiscal policy.In particular they do not distinguish current from—35—
futurecapital income tax rates, nor do they include estimates of the future
values of wage or consumption tax rates. Aa consequence the estimated coef-
ficients are of dubious value in describing the potential saving impact of
changes in fiscal policy.Other studies (Summers, 1981a, 1982; Evans, 1983;
Starrett, 1983) purport to simulate the interest elasticity of savings by exa-
mining the impact on wealth accumulation of a permanent cut in capital income
taxation.Since they alter no other tax rates in this analysis of interest
elasticities, they are implicitly assuming, according to (9),thatgovernment
consumption will be permanently reduced.These elasticities have, therefore, as
much to do with the savings response to reduced government consumption as they do
with private responses to capital income taxation.Indeed, since the bulk of
government consumption is financed by wage taxes it is surprising that attention
has focused on "the interest elasticity of saving" as opposed to "the wage
elasticity of saving".
Other research hasbeeniare sensitive to the multiplicity of future after—
tax prices determining current consumption and saving.Boskin and Lau (1978)
estimate aggregate demands for consumption and leisure taking account of several
current and future cross price effects.Unfortunately, while they report
sizeable elasticities of current consumption both with respect to the currentwage
and the price of future consumption, they do not trace out the implicationsof
these findings for feasible, concomitant changes in the time pathsof fiscal
instruments.A different approach to determining potential householdresponses
to government policies is direct estimation of household intertemporalpreferen-
ces.Robert Hall (1978) is the first of a series of articles (SanfordGrossman—36—
and Robert Shiller (1981); Lars Hansen andKennethSingleton (1983); Hall
Julio Rothemberg,
(1981); and Greg Mankiw, and Suimirs (1982)) that directly tests
some of the implications of intertemporal optimization under uncertainty.These
tests, the results of which are rather mixed, require specifying explicit func-
tional forms for household utility.A by—product of these tests is estimates of
key preference parameters, knowledge of which is sufficient to determine house-
hold responses to virtually all hypothetical policy changes.Several of the
utility functions estimated in the empirical literature have been used in simu-
lation studies discussed below.
The effects on national saving of contemporaneous tax—financed changes in
governmentconsumption depend not only on concomitant adjustments in par-
ticular tax instruments, but also on private valuation of government consump-
tion.If government consumption is a perfect substitute for private consumption
andis always intramargina.l with respect to private consumption decisions (i.e.
the private sector always consumes nre of each good than the government
directly provides) then (10) may be re—expressed as:
______
= Ho+Ao , (10')
t=or
where Z equals consumption by household jinclusiveof its imputed consumption
of government purchases of consumption goods and services in year t.
Intramarginal changes in the level and/or timing of government consumption
as well as concurrent changes in its finance through the tax system need not,
according to (10'), necessitate any changes in the Z.'s.Asin the case of
structural tax changes, such alterations in government policy leave the private
sector with sufficient resources to maintain its prior behavior.Here again-.37 —
thereis no change in aggregate income for the private econorr'; from a partial
equilibrium perspective, i.e., holding before—tax factor returns constant, tax—
financed increases in government consumption simply alter after—tax relative pri—
ces and produce compensated ixvements along the private sector's pre-tax
budget frontier.Assumingchangesin particular households' imputed government
consumption are not exactly matched by intra—marginal changes in their net tax
burden, there will be offsetting income effects across households.In this case
onemust account not only for the impact of tax changes on the after tax rela-
tive prices confronting particular households, but also for the net income
effectson those households arising from the government's revised pattern of con-
sumption.
F.Intergenerational Tax Policy
Intergenerational tax policy, as defined here, involves reduced taxation of
particular cohorts paid for (in present value) by increased taxation of other
cohorts.The time path of governmentconsumption isheld constant underthis
policy.As in the case of structural tax policy, in partial equilibrium, this
intergenerationalredistribution leaves unaltered the intertemporal consumption
and leisure frontier of the private sector.To simplify the analysis,
assume for the nmentthat alltaxes are lump sum.Iftheprivateeconomy con-
sistsof a single household that, because of concern for its progeny, is effec—
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Since intergeneration tax policy, by definition, generates zero revenue in pre——38—
sentialue and, under the assumption of non—distortionary (lump sum) taxation,
also alters no marginal prices, the private sector's budget constraint (n) is
completely unaffected by such policy.Consequently, intergenerational redistri—
bution will have no impact whatsoever on the economy.This argument, origi-
nating with David Ricardo (1951) and rigorously demonstrated by Barro (19Tt), can
obviously be extended to the case of multiple infinitely—lived households each
of which experiences intergenerational net lump sum taxation that sums to zero
in present value.
Incontrast to "infinitely lived" households, for "finite—lived" life cycle
households who,at least after their children are adults, are concerned
only with their own welfare, government intergenerational, non—distortionary
transfers alter private sector behavior.According to the strict, non—
altruistic life cycle paradigm, household heads and their spouses selfishly
spend their resources over the remainder of their own lives.The age of the
household is, thus, a critical variable in determining its marginal propensity
to consume; elderly households with only a few remaining years exhaust addi-
tional resources at a much faster rate than younger households, who spread
incremental resources over nDre periods.These age—related differences in
marginal propensities to consume goods and leisure explain why intergenera-
tional transfers to older generations lead to increased aggregate consumption
and reduced aggregate labor supply.
To procure the resources to redistribute towards early generations, the
government either draws down its own stock of assets, "borrows" from the pri-
vate sector, or "taxes" the private sector.As indicated above whether the—39--
governmentaquires current resources under the heading "borrowing" as opposed to
"taxes" may be of little or no economic consequence.Increased taxation
(resource payments to the government) of younger (including future) generations
which is not offset in present value by increased transfers(resource receipts
from the government) to such generations is necessary either to restore the
government's own net asset position, or, at a minimum, to offset the reduction
in the government's net capital income.Such higher net lifetime taxes are
likely to fall nist heavily on young or yet unborn generations.Thus the econo-
mic as opposed to accounting definition of "deficit finance" is any policy
resulting in an intergenerational redistribution of resources(Anthony
Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, 1980).
Assuming those households experiencing positive increases in net lifetime
resources predate those experiencing the losses, the policy will increase
the consumption and leisure of early generations and decrease the consumption
and leisure of later generations assuming consumption and leisure are both nor-
mal goods and that net taxation is lump sum.In real terms the additional con-
sumption accorded early generations is financed not by additional current
output, since early generations presumably work less not nore, but by reductions
in the econonr's stock of wealth.This "crowding out" of the econon's real
assets leaves future generations with less capital to combine with their labor
in production and implies, except for small open economies, general equilibrium
changes in factor returns.Each future generation may associate their reduced
standard of living resulting from economic deficits with higher net lifetime
taxation; but equation (ii), which holds from each point in time forward, mdi—cates that, under lump sum taxation, it is ultinntely a lower value of Ao, rela-
tive to what would otherwise have occurred that limits the private sector's
future consumption and leisure possibilities.A necessary and sufficient con-
dition for intergenerational redistribution under lump sum taxation is a change
in the time path of the econonT's holding of real wealth (i.e., values of Ao in
successive years).
While income effects are the primary focus of intergenerational tax policy,
redistribution across generations is typically conducted by changing the timing
and level of distortionary taxes.Hence, substitution as well as income effects
play a role in determining the full economic consequences of nny intergenera-
tional tax policies.
G.Intragenerational Tax Policy
This policy is defined as contemporaneous redistribution among members of
a given cohort.Assuming these members belong to different households such a
policy will produce offsetting income effects, with the net impact on aggregate
private consumption and saving depending on household differences in marginal
propensities to consume and to work.Intragenerational tax policy encompasses
redistribution potentially cross—classified by a very large set of socio-
economic characteristics including sex, race, education, marital status, number
of children, earnings, and accumulated wealth.Unfortunately, empirical evi-
dence on differences in marginal propensities to consume and work by such
characteristics is exceedingly scarce.
The commonplace notion that "redistribution from the rich to the poor redu-
ces saving" is probably the central concern surrounding intragenerational tax—iii—
policy.This concern seems based, to a large extent, not on adetailed com-
parison of differences in consumption propensities,but rather on the simple
observation that the rich have wealth and the poor donot.There are at least
four imndiate reasons why the level of currentassets could be unrelated to
underlying differences in preferences, and, therefore,differences in consump-
tion propensities.First, current wealth my reflect receipt ofintergenera-
tional transfers from wealthy parents and ancestorsKuznets (1961).Second,
current wealth my reflect random high returns topast investments (Friedman,
1957).Third, current wealth my simply reflect differencesin the timing of
receipt of labor earnings for a given present value(Modigliani and Brumberg,
l954;Ando and Modigliani, 1963).Fourth, household differences in earnings
abilities will produce differences in levels ofaccumulated wealth when house-
hold intertemporal preferences and marginalconsumption propensities are iden-
tical.
Of course, the current rich at a given age my berich because of differen-
ces in intertemporal preferences.Alternatively, the rich my differ from the
poor with respect to marginal consumptionpropensities because the poor are
liquidity constrained at the margin.Section VII briefly examines the available
evidence concerning intragenerational transfersin the presence of differences
in intertemporal preferences and liquidityconstraints.
IV.Savings and the Quantitative Impact of StructuralTax Policy
Neoclassical nxdels of economic growth posit utilitymaximizing consumption
and leisure decisions over either a finite orinfinite horizon.Modigliani and
Brumberg (195b) and Ando and Modigliani(1963) invoke the former assumption in— 2—
theirseminal development of the life cycle nDdel, while the later assumption is
an implication of Barro's(19114)equallyseminal article on intergenerational
altruism.Structural tax policies as well as the three other fiscal policies
defined above can have nrkedly different transitional and long term effects
depending on which of these two sets of preferences is considered.
The extent to which altruistic as opposed to selfish behavior best charac-
terizes actual intertemporal preferences is a nEtter of considerable contro-
versy.Articles by Ando and Modigliani (1963), James Tobin (1967), James Davies
(1981), King and Dicks—Mireaux (1982), and Modigliani (1983) provide evidence
in support of the strict, non altruistic life cycle ndel.In contrast, Betsy
White (1978), Thad W. Mirer (1979), Michael Darby (1919), Kotlikoff and Summers
(1981), Sheldon Danziger, Jacques van der Gaag, Eugene Smolensky and Michael
Taussig (1982), and Douglas Bernheim (1982) report results contrary to the life
cycle rxdel, suggesting an important, if not predominant role for private
intergenerational transfers in explaining the current stock of U.S. wealth.
Kotlikoffand Summers stress thatthe shapes of age—earnings and age—consumption
profilesare far fromthoserequired under the strict life cycle nodel to pro-
duce significanthump saving.This finding does not, however, preclude the
possibility that themajority of households conform to the selfish life cycle
model.The majority of households could have such preferences, but simply have
very litle "hump" savings.We may well live in a mixed society consisting of a
minority of quite wealthy, altruistic households, and a majority of rather poor,
life—cycle households (Kuznets, 1961).While life cycle households may hold
little, if any, of the current stock of wealth, their response to new structural_14 3.....
as well as intergenerational tax policies could well dictate the econon''s
saving behavior over several decades, even if not the indefinite future.
Another explanation of the evidence for significant intergenerational
transfers that is consistent with life cycle behavior involves imperfections in
the market for annuity insurance.In the absence of a well functioning annuity
market, elderly households may share the risk of their uncertain longevity with
their children in a manner that involves intergenerational transfers (Kotlikoff
and Avia Spivak 1981).Alternatively, the elderly may simply involuntarily
bequeath to their children extracting either nothing or non—monetary services in
exchange (Davies, 1961; Bernheim, Andre Shleifer, and Sumrs, 1983).
Section VI describes the failure of econometric research based on the
limited available data to clarify the degree of marginal altruism in the U.S.
econon'.Given our state of ignorance concerning the distribution of intertem—
poral preferences, exploring the implications of tax policy within each of the
two alternative models is important; indeed, analysis of models with heteroge-
neous preferences is an obvious area for additional research.
A.StructuMi Tax Policy in a Life Cycle Model
In the life cycle model each household makes independent choices, but the
combined behavior of more than 60 contemporaneously living adult age cohorts
enters into the determination of the general equilibrium transition path of a
life cycle econo.The econoixy's transition path also depends on the
future decisions of generations not yet in existence; today's generations base
current economic choices partly on information about future wages and interest
rates.These future prices are determined not only by the saving and labor_)4 4_
supp1,decisions of those currently alive, but also by the saving and labor
supply behavior of succeeding generations; today's twenty yearold's expec-
tations about wage rates when she reaches thirty is partlyinfluencedby her
expectations of the labor supply of twenty year old's ten years from nowwhose
labor supply, in turn, depends on expectations of the labor supply oftwenty
year olds twenty years from now, and on and on.
The complexity of the multi—cohort life cycle idel as well as its exten-
sive, if not unlimited data requirements, has led ny economists tosimulate
rather than empirically estimate the effects of government policy in non—
altruistic neoclassical environments.Simulation analysis of steady (or
stationary) state predictions of life cycle economies dates from Ando and
Modigliani (1963), Tobin (1967),andAtkinson (1971).Papers by Tobin and
Walter Dolde (1971, 1981), Eytan Sheshinski(1978), and Kotlikoff (1919) simu-
late the impact of social security on steady state laborsupply and savings.
Summers (1981) presents a steady state simulation analysis of othergovernment
fiscal policies, in particular, structural tax policy.Merton Miller and
Charles Upton (1971) and Summers (1981a) simulate effects ofselected government
policies on the growth path of life cycle economies under the assumptionof
nopic expectations.
Summers' 1981 article represents a very important contribution to the aria—
lysis of taxation and savings.His comparison of equal (annual) revenue wage
and consumption tax regimes illustrates the intergenerationalredistribution
underlying many structural tax policies; the paper also stresses thatlowering
capital income tax rates reduce current private consumption not onlythrough_1; 5—
substitutioneffects associates with the higher price of current relative to
future consumption, but also through income affects associated dth the reduced
present value of a household's human capital endowment.
In a series of articles Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1982)
and Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Jonathan Skinner (1983)extendedthis research by
developing a perfect foresight general equilibrium life cycle simulation model.
"Perfect foresight" in this context means that households make economic choices
based on common projections of future wages, interest rates, and tax rates, and
these decisions, in the aggregate, produce equilibrium time paths of these
variables equal to those projected.In the life cycle version of the model con—
sidered here agents live for 55periods,corresponding to adult ages of 21 to
T5,andareconcerned only with their own welfare, i.e., they have no bequest
motive.The model incorporates variable labor supply, including endogenous
retirement, and a wide range of fiscal instruments, including investment incen-
tives, progressive taxes, and social security.Its chief contribution is deter-
mining the equilibrium transition path generated byfiscalpolicies.
"Equilibriumtransition path" corresponds to the course of the economy as it
moves from one stationary equilibrium to another.During this transition there
ismarket clearing for all goods, factors, and assets.While the model solves
for the course of all economic variables over a 150 year period, convergence for
the new stationary state in the simulations described here typically occurs
within 70 years.
The extended focus on this particular model's results in the succeeding
discussion y appear excessive, but the intention is to illustrate potential—b 6—
differencesin the quantitative affects of the four policies considered;
obviously, isolating these differences requires holding themodelconstant while
changing the experiment.One ny also question the emphasis on simulation
results rather than empirical findings.Simulation analysis is certainly no
substitute for empirical research; rather it provides a nthodolor for
exploring the full implications of empirical findings.Unfortunately there is
no large scale neoclassical econometric nodel that can be simulated to estimate
the general equilibrium savings impact of policy.The computer simulation nodel
used here incorporates CES utility and production functions, which are fre-
quently posited in empirical studies.In addition, the parameterization of the
model is based on empirical findings.
While simulation studies of this kind are best viewed as a second stage of
empirical analysis, i.e., as ways to display the implications of parameter esti-
mates and assumptions about particular function forms, they are also useful
tools for designing empirical studies.Empirical work proceeds by assuming
functional relations and testing their validity; simulating the affects of these
functional relations for different parameter values in advance of empirical
testing permits the researcher to trace outthefull implications of his (her)
assumptions andtodistinguish critically important from less important para-
meter values.Such knowledge will likely lead the econometrician to "spend"
more of his (her) limited data on estimating parameters to which the simulation
results are nost sensitive.
While one ry be dubious about the absolute magnitude of changes in econo-
mic variables arising in simulation models, the nodels are likely to permit nore147
reliableinferences concerning the relative effects of alternative policies.
Thus one may find through simulation analysis that one tax structure is vir-
tually always more conducive to saving than another within a large class of eco-
nomic models.For certain policy choices a qualitative ranking of alternatives
may be all that is needed.
Equation (12) presents the CES utility function of consumption, C, and





In (12) 8 in the time preference rate,p is the "static" elasticity of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure at each age a, and y is the interternporal
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure at different ages.
The reciprocal of y equals the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Baseline arameter values for 6, y, p and a, the elasticity of substitution
of capital for labor in the production function, are .015, .25,.8and1.These
figures are mid—range estimates based on a variety of empirical studies many of
which are cited in Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983).
Table 3 contains simulation results for three structural tax policies
involving changes in the tax base from proportional income taxation to either
proportional consumption, wage, or capital income taxation with each designed to
yield equal revenues.The simulated econon' has an initial steady state
capital—output ratio of 3.7, a capital—labor ratio of 5,apre-tax wage nor-
malized to 1, a 6.7percentpre—tax real interest rate, a 3.7 percent net








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.there are no transfer programs conducted either through "official" or
"unofficial" mechanisms, receipts from the 15 percent income tax are solely used
to finance government consumption.In each of Table 3's simulations government
consumption per capita is held fixed, and the tax rate of the specified tax
base is adjusted to produce revenues equal, on an annual basis, to the exogenous
path of government consumption.
Table 3displaysthe primarily large impact structural tax policies can
have on an econon's saving rate and related variables.Relative to the initial
income tax regime, long runsavingrates are 19 percent larger under a consump-
tion tax, 8percentlarger under a wage tax, and 32 percent smaller under a
capital income tax.Changes in the econon's saving rate during the transition
period are even xrre dramatic; in the first year after the switch to consumption
taxation, the saving rate rises to 9.3percentfrom an initial value of 3.T.In
the case of the capital income tax, there is a negative 2.9 percent saving rate
in the first year of the transition, and saving rates remain negative for over a
decade.As Table 1indicatessuch swings in saving rates are within the range
of U.S. historical experience, although U.S. saving experience is certainly
neither solely nor primarily a reflection of historical changes in fiscal
policy.The figures in Table 3 would, of course, all be magnified inabsolute
value if one started with a larger initial steady state income tax.For
example, a structural shift to consumption taxation starting from a 30 percent
income tax ultimately increases the capital—labor ratio by 63percent,rather
than the 2 percent increase of Table 3.
The capital deepening associated with switching from the 15 percent income—4 9—
taxto consumption and wage taxation generates long runpre—taxwage rates that
are respectively 6percentand 2 percent larger than their initial values.In
the case of capital income taxation, the long run wage rate is 13 percent
snllerthan inthe initial equilibrium.The long—run pre—tax real interest
ratedeclinesby one percent or less under consumption or wage taxation, while
itrises 3. percentage pointsunder capital income taxation.Long run tax
rates are 17.6percentunder a consumption tax, 20.1 percent under a wage tax,
and 62.7percentunder a capital income tax.The much larger rate required
under capital income taxation obviously reflects the fact that capital income is
a much smaller tax base than total income, labor income, or consumption.
These changes in after tax prices of factors and goods obviously alter the
utility levels of each cohort alive at the time of the tax change or born
thereafter.One measure of these utility differences is the equivalent percen-
tage increase in full lifetime resources needed in the original income tax
regime to produce each cohort's realized level of utility under the specified
alternative tax regimes.For cohorts living in the new long run equilibrium
under consumption, wage, and capital income tax regimes the equivalent
variations are 2.32 percent, —.89percent,and —1.lpercent.These figures
are smaller than the long run changes in wage rates indicated in Table 3,
becausethey encompass the additional amount of both lifetime leisure and con—
sumption that could hypothetically be afforded in the old steady state.Stated
differently since 65percentof lifetime resources are spent on leisure in the
initial steady state, a 2.32 percent increase in full time resources would per-
mit a 6.63(2.32/.35)percentincrease in lifetime consumption, holding leisure—50—
constant.
One perhaps surprising feature of these numbers is that steady state uti-
lity is lower under wage taxation than under income taxation despite an 8per-
cent increase in capital intensity.While the before tax wage rises to 1.02
from an initial value of 1, the after tax wage is .80 in the wage tax steady
state compared with .85underthe income tax.In addition, the long—run after—
tax interest rate, which determines prices of future consumption and leisure is
only .61 percentage points greater in the wage taxation steady state.These
numbers are indicative of, rather than the reason for, the lower level of steady
state welfare under wage versus income taxation.Despite the 21 percent greater
capital stock in the wage tax steady state, aggregate steady state consumption
is lower reflecting the smaller aggregate supply of labor induced by the
increased wage tax.While the new steady state has sufficient resources to
sustain a higher level of welfare, the choice between consumption and leisure is
suboptimally skewed towards leisure by the new post—tax intertemporal price
structure imposed by a wage tax.Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) demon-
strate that for the CES utility function given in (12) wage taxation is Pareto
inefficient relative to income taxation over a wide range of parameter values
partly because it places all the tax distortion on the static choice between
consumption and leisure, while leaving intertemporal decisions free of marginal
distortions; i.e., it does not directly alter the after—tax rate of return, a
key determinant of relative prices of goods and leisure at different dates.The
income tax, in contrast, spreads the tax distortions over both margins of choice
and the larger tax base permits lower taxrates.16The situation here is similar—51—
to thatpicturedin figure 2, where utility at B is less than at A, although the
resource endowment (line 2) is unchanged.
The consumption tax affords a higher steady state level of welfare than the
income, wage, or capital income taxes, because it derives a part of its portion
revenue from an implicit lump sum levy, which implies less dead weight loss from
distortionary taxation.Intuitively, consumption taxation is, in part, effec-
tively equivalent to a capital levy, because household wealth is indirectly taxed
when it is ultimately surrendered in exchange for consumption goods.The capi-
tal levy represents a lump sum tax, since at the time the consumption tax is im-
posed, current wealth is given (i.e., is in perfectly inelastic supply.)
Chamley (1981) and Black (1981) emphasize the equivalence, for time invariant
tax rates, of consumption taxation to wage taxation plus a one time capital
levy.In the case of time varyingtaxrates a consumption tax is structurally
equivalent to a capital levy, plus taxation of wageandcapital income at dif-
ferent rates over time.
Thesecond reason for the long run utility gain under consumption taxation
as opposed to income taxation is the shift in the tax burden from later to
earlier generations, a point stressed by Summers (1981) and David Bradford
(1982). Take the age 55lifecycle agent as an example.In his last year in the
15 percent income tax steady state he consumes the principle plus 85percentof
the capital income earned from his terminal period assets.Since the pre—tax
interest rate in the initial steady state is 6.7percent,terminal consumption
is 1.067timesterminal assets plus any after tax labor income.If the economy
switches abruptly to a consumption tax,the first year consumption tax rate is—52—
19.2 percent, and the 55yearold's terminal assets will purchase only .839
unitsofconsumption times the amount of these assets.Whiletheequivalent
negative variation in lifetime utility for the 55yearold in the consumption
tax simulation is less than one third of a percent, the equivalent variation is
negative 15.2 percent if one considers only the remaining lifespan of the 55
yearold.The loss in welfare to these early generations plus the use ofa irore
efficient taxstructureare what pays for the higher level of welfare of later
generations, including those in the new steady state, under consumption taxation.
B.Simulated Structural Tax Policy-SensitivityAnalysis
Thesensitivity of the Table 3resultsto assumed parameter values and func-
tional form for preferences and production is of obvious importance for their
evaluation.The empirical literature suggests extreme values fori, the inter—
temporal elasticity of substitution, of between .1 and .5,andvalues for p, the
static elasticity of substitution of between .1 and 1.5.Holding all other
parameter values constant, combinations of these values generate percentage
increases in the long runcapital—laborratio under the structural shift from
income to consumption taxation ranging from 22.6 to 26.9.The baseline (y=.25,
p.8) simulation generated a 2.O percent increase.
There is ixore sensitivity to these parameter values in the case of struc-
tural wage tax policy.Here the baseline increase in capital intensity is 8.0
percentwith extreme values of 3.8percentand11.1percent over the specified
range of values for y and p.The third structural tax policy described in Table
3,ashift from income to capital income taxation, produces a 2.0 percent drop
in the capital—labor ratio for baseline values of y and p anda sensitivity—53—
rangeof 28.6 to 51.5 percent.
Evans' 1983 article suggests that life cycle simulation results may be
highly sensitive to assumptions concerning the rate of time preference.This
appears not to be the case for a structural change to consumption taxation.The
baseline simulation that incorporates a 1.5 percent rate of time preference,
yields a 214.0 percent change in capital intensivity.Lowering the time pre-
ference rate to negative 3 percent produces a 214.8 percent increase, while
raising it to 14percentyields a 214.6 percent increase.Similar experiments for
shifting to wage taxation led to respective changes in capital—labor ratios of
2.23 percent and 12.9 percent compared with the 8percentbaseline change.In
the case of a structural shift to capital income taxation, the sensitivity to
time preference rates is quite substantial.The percentage decrease in capital
intensity is 12.5 percent when the time preference rate, ó, is —.03, it is 142.0
percent when a is .015, and it is 56.5percentwhen a is.014.
A final parameter value to consider in the context of this model is the
elasticity of substitution in the production function.Lowering this rate in
the CES production function from 1 to .8ledto 19.8 percent, 9.6percent,and
50.7percentlong—run changes in capital—labor ratios respectively, from con-
sumption, wage, andcapitalincome structural tax changes.These numbers can be
compared with 214.0 percent, 8.0percent,and 142.0 percent in the baseline case.
The following points summarize these results concerning structural changes
in proportional tax bases in the standard CES life—cycle mDdel.First, for a
set of plausible parameter values a shift from income to consumption taxation
generates significant increases in long—run savings, wage rates, and economic—54—
welfare.The opposite is true for capital income taxation.Structural wage tax
policy, on the other band, while it stimulates some additional savings, can
lower long—run economic welfare.Second, long—run gains or losses in economic
welfare are paid, in part, by opposite changes in the welfare of certain genera-
tions alive during the transition induced by the new tax structure.Third, the
impact of a shift to consumption taxation is quite insensitive to reasonable
variations in parameter values.The effects of these structural wage and capi-
tal income tax policies are tore sensitive to deviations in baseline parameter
values, but such deviations do not alter the sign of their impact on long—run
savings.Finally, substitution effects appear to dominate offsetting cross—
cohort income effects in altering long—run savings rates.The move to capital
income taxation provides a good example.Here the negative income effects of an
increased tax burden faced by the elderly and the corresponding positive income
effects of decreased taxation experienced by young and middle—aged cohorts, which
serve to stimulate saving (because of generational differences in marginal pro-
pensities to consume goods and leisure), are outweighed by the negative substitu-
tion effects that induce tore current and less future consumption and leisure.
These substitution effects are determined not only by preferences, but also by
the household's time path of full—time earnings capacity; i.e., as stressed by
Summers (1981), a given change in after—tax interest rates will produce dif-
ferent revaluation of the worker's endowment of full—time earnings if these
full—time earnings, arrive tore in the future than in the present.Summers'
"human—wealtheffect" playsa role in determining both income and substitution
effectsofchanges in discount rates.—55—
Afinal issue of sensitivity analysis involves choice of functional form.
Presently there appear to be no studies comparing structural tax changes in life
cycle nodeis using different general functional forms for preferences and tech-
nologies.Such a study would be quite informative.Starrett (1983) uses the
Stone—Geary generalization of the CES utility function in a study of tax—
financed changes in government consumption.He finds smaller increases in
national wealth arising from reductions in government consumption that are
financed by cuts in capital income taxation than does Summers (1981) who employs
the standard CES functional form.Whether Starrett's nonhomothetic preferences
are nore plausible than those considered here is obviously an issue to be deter-
mined empirically.
B.Structural Tax Policy —Increasingthe Progressivity of the Rate Structure
in a Life Cycle Model
The impact of progressive tax schedules on savings is illustrated, in part,
by considering an equal revenue switch from proportional to progressive taxa-
tion.There is obviously no unique progressive tax schedule to compare with
proportional taxation, but consideration of the linear marginal tax schedule
given in (13) provides a sense of potential affects.
Tm=1+ B (13)
In (13) B stands for the tax base, and a1 and a2 are two coefficients that are
chosen each year subject to the constraint that the new tax schedule produces
the sameannualrevenue as the proportional tax structure.
The baseline life cycle siimilation nodel outlined above was used to examine—56—
theconsequences of switching from 30 percent proportional taxation to a
progressive tax schedule featuring a marginal rate of 20 percent (i.e., =.2)
at zero income.Pegging a1 at .2 leaves the annual revenue constraint to deter-
mine a2 in (13).Households in the model fully incorporate the time path of
changes in progressive tax schedules (annual changes in a2 occuring during the
transition) in making their intertemporal consumption and leisure decisions.With
the exception of the income tax, this type of progressive structural tax change
produces rather small changes in capital—labor ratios and savings rates.The
percentage change in capital intensity (saving rates) is —36(-J46) percentin
the case of income taxation, it is —10 (—7)percentunder capital income taxa-
tion, and —6(_!4)percent under wage taxation.There is a positive 3.7(2.8)
percentage change in capital intensity (the net national saving rate) in the
case of the switch from proportional to progressive consumption taxation.Since
the reduction is capital intensity and, therefore, the reduction in the tax base
per capita is greatest under the progressive income tax, the level of a2 needed
to generate the requisite percapita revenues is substantially larger (over 3
times)underprogressive income taxation than under wage or consumption taxa-
tion, and almost twice as large as the a2 obtained in the case of progressive
capital income taxation.Marginal tax rates peak at 82 percent, 51 percent, 145
percent,and 33 percent, respectively ,underthe progressive income, wage,
capitalincome, and consumption tax regimes.
The increase in savings in the progressive consumption tax simulation
reflects, in large part,theintergenerational transfer from the initial
elderly implied by this policy.Since consumption rises with ageinthe initial—57—
steadystate, the first generation of aged face a larger tax burden under the
equal revenue progressive consumption tax than under the proportional consump-
tion tax; i.e., the initial elderly find themselves in higher narginal consump-
tion tax brackets than younger cohorts.In contrast, the shift from
proportional income to progressive income taxation reduces the tax burden of the
initial elderly, since their income (capital plus wage) is low relative to that
of middle aged workers, although their capital income is relatively high.Hence
the intergenerational income effects reinforce the substitution effects of
lowering savings under progressive income taxation.Similar income effects do
not arise in the case of increasing the progressivity of either a wage tax or a
capital income tax.
C.Structural Tax Policies —ProportionalTaxation in an Infinite Horizon
Model
Barro's (1974) article describes how overlapping intergenerational altruism
generates a utility function in which each household effectively acts as if it
were infinitely lived.The argument is clarified in (14) which assumes that
each generation t's utility, U., depends on its own consumption and leisure and
the utility of its imnEdiate offspring, For simplicity generations are
assumed to live for only one period.
=u., (Ct,£t, u.,1(C+1,£t+l, U.•4•2 (c+2,Lt+2,...)
= (14)
=Vt(Ci, £t, Ct,1,
Theutility linkage of generation t to generation t+1 effectively connects
generation t to all future generations, and (114) collapses into a function of
the entire future time path of consumption and leisure of the current household—58—
andits descendants.If this utility function is homothetic then the
av av
marginalrate of substitution / is independent of the stationary
t+1 t
state levels of C and L.t.Utility maximization requires an equality
between this rate of substitution and 1 plus the after tax real rate
of return, denoted here as r(1_rr), where
Tristhe marginal tax rate
on capital income.Hence the long run after tax rate of return is equal to the
av
time preferencerate, / —1,a constant for a homothetic utility
t t
function that is independent of the levels of consumption and leisure.The
term r, however, is determined in general equilibrium by the marginal product of
capital.Assuming constant returns to scale in production, it is easy to show
that the long—run capital—labor ratio is independent of marginal wage or con-
sumption taxes, but depends simply on the capital income tax rate, the constant
steady state rate of time preference and parameters of the production function.
For example, if the production function is Cobb—Douglas with a capital share of
.25, a switch from a 15 percent income tax to either a wage or consumption tax
increases long—run capital intensity in general equilibrium by 24 percent;
starting with a 30 percent income tax, the long run percentage increase is 61
percent.A switch to capital income taxation from a 10 percent income tax
steady state lowers long—run capital intensity by 147 percent; structural shifts
to capital income taxation starting with a larger initial income tax are not
feasible long run policies for this ndel.The reason for the reduction in
capital intensity in the case of a structural shift to capital income taxation
is the higher tax on capital income, 14 percent instead of 10 percent required
to satisfy the revenue constraint.Using a .8elasticityof substitution in—59—
production,a, reduces these changes in capital intensity by about 30 percent;
the sensitivity of tax policy to this parameter value is discussed in Chamley
(1981).The fact that a lower value of a reduces the impact of structural tax
policy is intuitive, at least in the limit; when a equals zero, capital and
labor are used in fixed proportions, and the distinction between capital and
labor income taxes disappears.
In the case of progressive taxation, homothetic preferences of the form
given in (114) still imply a steady state equality between the after (marginal)
tax return to capital and the time preference rate.If the progressive tax
structure exhibits monotone increasing tax rates, marginal tax rates will exceed
average tax rates, and the steady state marginal tax rate under the progressive
tax structure nxist differ from that in the initial proportional tax steady state
due to the equal revenue requirement.While it seems likely that a switch from
proportional to progressive taxation of all income or simply capital income will be
associated with higher marginal taxation of capital income and, therefore,
smaller values of capital per worker, this remains an area for future investiga—
tion.A related set of apparently unexplored structural tax questions is the
consequence of switching from proportional to progressive wage or consumption
taxation.The results in each of these cases will depend on assumptions con-
cerning legal restrictions and additional tax obligations confronting altruistic
households in shifting taxable income to family members in lower marginal tax
brackets.
E.Structural Tax Policy in a Small Open Econon'
The foregoing discussion applies to closed economies or to a world econonrj—6o—
consistingof countries that are identical up to a scale factor and that
simultaneously engage in the same fiscal policy.To see how strikingly dif-
ferent the impact of particular structural tax policies can be in an open eco—
nonw, consider switching from wage to capital income taxation under the
following four simplifying assumptions.First, the econov in question is
small and places no restrictions on imports or exports of perfectly mobile finan-
cial and physical capital.Second, there are only two factors of production,
capital and labor.Third, labor is mobile domestically, but not internationally.
Fourth, foreign governments do not engage in any fiscal policy whatsoever.
Under these circumstances the foreign pre—tax rate of return is given and
domestic residents will change their mix of foreign and domestic investment to
maximize their after—tax return.If the home country taxes the capital income
of domestic residents regardless of where that income is earned, the switch
from wage to capital income taxation will have the type of effects on savings
just described, except that general equilibrium changes in before—tax factor
prices will be trivial because the home country is small.If, on the other
hand, the home country taxes both its own residents and foreigners at the same
rate on income earned only on domestic capital, capital will flow out of the
home country until after—tax rates of return are equalized internationally.The
domestic pre—tax wage will fall in response to a reduction in the capital—labor
ratio.If labor is supplied inelastically, the pre—tax wage will decline until
the fall in pre—tax labor income exactly equals the government's tax revenue;
i.e., labor bears the entire burden (incidence) of the capital income tax.
Hence, "the shift to capital income taxation" in this case simply replaces anexplicit wage tax with an implicit wage tax.If labor is elastically supplied
the wage will differ somewhat across the two tax regimes, but the basic point
holds that the econon effectively ends up with a wage tax despite the reported
change in tax structure.
The degree of international capital ibility at the margin is particularly
important for determining whether to try to stimulate savings through changes in
corporate or personal capital income taxation.If the personal capital income
tax is levied on such income regardless of where it is earned, while the cor-
porate income tax is levied only on capital income earned domestically, a switch
from wage to corporate profits taxation may simply replace an explicit wage tax
with an implicit one.Switching to personal taxation on capital income earned
either at home or abroad, on the other hand, could have major impacts on inter-.
temporal prices confronting domestic households, and, therefore, major impacts
on household consumption and national savings.
V.The Impact of Contemporaneous Tax—Financed Increases in Government
Consumption
A.Results for the Life Cycle Model
This section considers changes in government consumption under the assump-
tion that such consumption either is not an argument of private utility
functions or that the utility of government consumption is separable from that
of private consumption and leisure.In either case the choice of government
consumption does not directly affect private marginal rates of substitution bet-
ween current and future consumption and leisure.Hence, changes in government
consumption affect private choices of these variables only indirectly—62—
altering variables (e.g., tax rates) entering private budget constraints.
Inlife cycle economies increases in the level of government consumption,
financed ona contemporaneous basis by increases in tax rates have quite dif-
ferent impacts on national savings depending on the tax base in place.For
example, using the baseline parameter values of section IV, a permanent doubling
of the level of government consumption per capita (from an initial level equal
to 15 percent of the specified tax base) leads to respective reductions between
initial and final steady states in capital—labor ratios and national savings
rates of 26.2 percent and 20.4 percent under the income tax, 12.3 percent and
9.7percentunder the wage tax, 14.5 percent and 11.0 percent under the capital
income tax, but only 1.2 percent and .01 percent under the consumption tax.
Long—run crowding out of capital per dollar increase in government consumption
is 5.9dollarsunder income tax finance, 4.8dollarsunder wage tax finance, 6.5
dollarsunder capital income tax finance, but negative 3 cents under consumption
tax finance.17
Different income and substitution effects experienced by particular cohorts
are important for understanding these results.Compare, for example, the con-
sumption and wagetax results.Inthe consumption tax case initial elderly
generations, with high marginal propensities to consume, share immediately and
significantlyin the burden of the higher taxes and reducetheir consumption and
leisure accordingly.Younger cohorts also lower their current consumption and
leisure in response to their lower effective lifetime resources; however, they
spread this lifetime loss over the future as well as the present.These private
changes significantly offset the increased rate of government consumption; in—63—
thefirst year of the economic transition each dollar increase in government
consumption is offset by 89centsless in private consumption.
In contrast, the contemporaneous wagetaxfinanced increase in government
consumptionhas little impact on the elderly who are largely out of the
workforce; while younger cohorts do reduce their currentconsumption and leisure
inresponse to the increased lifetime tax burden, their immediate responseis
limitedbecause of their ability and desire to smooth these reductions over the
remainder of their lives.In addition, the substitution effects leading to
reduced labor by the young and middle—aged are significantly greater under wage
taxationthan under consumption taxation; the reason is the higher effective tax
on labor earnings and lower effective net wage, when the net wageis measured in
terms of additional consumption that can be attained by working an additional
hour.The fact thatinitial elderly generations pay for little if any of the
additionalgovernment consumption means higher effective marginal taxationof
laborsupply for younger and future generations.
In the first year of the wage tax transition there is over a 3 percent
reduction in the simulated econonf's labor supply.This implies, of course, less
current output, and less current saving even holding aggregate consumption
constant.These initial effects are not transitory; they are part of an
equilibrium shift to a permanently different econony.The reduction in
current saving means lower capital—labor ratios in subsequent periods, lower
pretax wages, and higher wage tax rates given the prespecified revenue require-
ment of the government.
Substitution effects also play a major role in the simulation of income tax—6b--
andcapital income tax financed increases in government consumption.The higher
capital income taxes here lead households to substitute current consumption and
leisure for future consumption and leisure.In the income tax case, each dollar
of increased government consumption in year 1 of the transition is offset by
only T3centsof reduced private consumption; in addition there is a 1.5 percent
reduction in employment.Under a pure capital income tax regime the private
consumption offset is only 10 cents on the dollar; however, the initial change
in employment is minimal.
These results are presented to illustrate rather than exhaustively examine
the savings impact of contemporaneous tax financed increases in governmentcon-
sumption.As in the case of structural tax policy some of these resultsare
sensitive to certain parameter values and the functional form of the utility
function (Starrett (1983)).
B.Tax—Financed Increases in Government Consumption—theInfinite Horizon
Model
Under the assumption of a homothetic, infinite horizon utility function and
constant returns to scale in production the discussion in section III indicated
that steady state capital intensity is independent of wage or consumption income
taxes since neither tax structure directly alters the marginal return to
saving in the steadystate.18Hence, an immediate permanent increase in govern-
ment consumption will have no long—run affects on capital—labor ratios to the
extent this consumption is financed by wage or consumption taxation.The abso-
lute levels, however, of capital and labor supply may change both in the short
and long run in response to the increased taxation.This clearly depends on—65--
variabilityin labor supply.If labor supply isexogenous and the utility tune-.
tion is time separable, the private sector immediatelyreduces its own consump-
tion by an amount exactly equal to the increasein government consumption and
thecapital stock, a closed econonr's wealth ina one good model, remains
unchanged.19When labor supply is variableor the increase in government consump-
tion is financed, at least partially, by capital incometaxation, there will be
short— as well as long—run effects on the absoluteamount of savings.
Illustrative simulations of steady—state changesin levels of government
consumption for the infinite horizon version of the CESutility function in
(12), assuming section IV's baselineparameter values and government consumption
initially financed by a 15 percent tax rate, produce thefollowing results.
Doubling government consumption decreases the econoi"slong—run per capita.
wealth by 22 percent if financed by income taxation,by .5percentif financed
by wage taxation, by 22 percent if financed by capitalincome taxation, and by
—2 percent if financed by consumption taxation.
VI.The Savings Impact of Intergenerational Tax Policy
A.Major Themes in the Literature
Feldstein's (1974) article on social security andsavings sparked an
intensive empirical and theoretical analysis of the savingsimpact of interge-
nerational transfers.Much of this research has focusedon the particular
effects of unfunded social securityon savings (Alicia Munnell, 1974; Feldstein
and Anthony Pellechio, 1979; Kotlikoff, 1979a, 1979b;Barro, 1978;Darby,
19T9; Mordecai Kurz, 1981; Selig Lesnoy and Dean Leimer, 1981;Feldstein,
1980, 1982a; Alan Blinder, Roger Gordon,and Donald Wise, 1980; Kurz, 1981;—66—
Diamondand Hausman, 1982; Auerbachand Kotlikoff,1982).But this research
also stimulated economists tosearch for other subtle,but potentially quite
powerful uchanism by which thegovernment transfers resources across genera-
tions.In his second seminalcontribution to this literatureFeldstein (1977)
demonstrates how tax—inducedrevaluation of land transfers resourcesintramargi—
nally across generations.While such asset revaluationShave no effect in inf i—
nite horizon economies(Barro, 19T4; Calvo, Kotlikoff, andCarlos Rodriguez,
19T9), they are important in the lifecycle model; for middle—aged andelderly
cohorts who are the principal ownersof land and other assets,government—
induced capital losses lower thevalue of non—human wealthmeasured in terms of
consumption goods.It is important to realize thatthese capital losses can far
exceed the current explicit taxpayments which induce suchrevaluations.In
the case of a land rent tax,the price of land falls by thepresent value of
the infinite stream of currentand future tax payments.For young and unborn
generations the reduced land priceis equivalent to a lump—sum subsidy,since
they now purchase this fixedproductive asset by surrendering fewerconsumption
goods to theirpredecessors.2°As mentioned in section III, suchintergenera-
tional redistribution in life cyclemodels alters current saving becauseof
cross—cohort differences in marginalpropensities to consume goods andleisure.
Just as unfunded social securityconstitutes a hidden wa for governments
to run economic deficits,tax—induced asset revaluation constitutes ahidden way
for governments to runeconomic surpluses.If they so choose, governmentscould
explicitly report very sizeableofficial surpluses without changing anyreal
economic policy: rather thancovertly taxing the wealth of oldergenerations and—67—
indiectlyhanding the receipts to young and future generations, they could
explicitly levy a one time wealth tax, collecting proceeds that exactlyequal
each household's capital loss under the corresponding implicit policy,and
distribute the funds over time in a lump sum fashion to young and future genera-
tions.While this change in accounting procedures, if properly enacted, alters
no one's intertemporal budget constraint, includingthe government's, the
increase in current period receipts from the wealth tax would be reported as a
surplus.
Feldstein's (1977)essaywasfollowedby analyses by King (1977),Auerbach
(1979),andDavid Bradford (1980, 1981) demonstrating that if corporations are
prohibited from repurchasing their shares, one maystill,observe corporations
paying dividends despite that fact that personal income taxation favors capital
gains relative to dividend income.The advantage to capital gains is arbitraged
away,inequilibrium, by equity values that rise by less than a dollar for every
dollar of retained earnings.That is, shareholders are indifferent at the
margin between receiving dividends, or having corporations retain earnings.
Dividends are taxed at higher rates, while retained earnings lead to less than
dollar for dollar capital gains, but are taxed at a lower rate when realized.
In such economies where dividends are being paid, equity values always adjust to
provide the same effective rate of return old investments yielding dividends as
on investments yielding capital gains.In these xdels the marginal after—tax
return to capital income is a direct function solely of the tax rate oncapital
gains.The tax rate on capital gains is the rate that influences marginal capi-
tal income taxation because it is lower than the dividend tax rate; i.e., the—68—
returnon dividends is forced to adjust to the return on retained earnings via
equity valuation.A corollary of this result is that increasing the dividend
tax rate has no direct impact on the after—tax return to capital.Increasing
dividendtaxation does, however, lead to a fall in stock market values andan
associated intergenerational redistribution of resources that stimulates life
cycle savings.
This surprising result in which increasing a particular capital income
tax instrument unambiguouslystimulatessavings in a life cycle ntdel is charac-
teristic of a much broader class of policies than simply increases in dividend
taxation.Summers (1981c) describes the implications for asset valuation of a
variety of fiscal policies, pointing out that the price of old capital declines
in response to investment incentives that discriminate in favor ofnew capital.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1982) demonstrate in a general equilibrium Context that
investment incentives, such as accelerated depreciation or investment taxcre-
dits, stimulate saving (investment in a closed econor,r) through implicitone-
time wealth taxation of pre—existing capital; in addition, in thepresence of
significant investment incentives, such as those now in place in the U.S.,
raising either corporate or personal tax rates on capital income also lowers
stock market values, thereby redistributing resources intergenerationalLy and
stimulating savings in life cycle economies.
The example of introducing 100 percent expensing of new capital inan eco—
non' with a v percent proportional income tax permits an intuitive explanation
of these results.Assume, for simplicity, that there is a single homogeneous
form of capital that does not physically depreciate.Then the legislated and—69—
effectivemarginal tax rate on capital income is r prior to the introduction of
expensing.Introducing full expensing completely eliminates the effective
marginal tax on capital income; for new capital the immediate subsidy of icents
per dollar invested offsets in present value the stream of taxes that are paid
on the return to this marginal infinitely livedinvestment.21
By assumption, pre—existing capital is either ineligible for expensing, or
is effectively ineligible because of recapture taxes.Hence, in order to pro-
vide the same after tax return to investors as new capital, the market value of
old capital must fall by T cents on the dollar; i.e., the value of capital rela-
tive to its replacement cost, "Tobin's q," is given by q =1—r.If 100 percent
expensing is initially in place, raising t has no impact on the marginal return
to capital, since investing in new capital provides a larger initial subsidy to
offset the now larger future taxes on the investment's return.On the other
hand, raising t induces additional capital losses to old capital according to
the formula for q.This covert redistribution from older to young and future
generations reduces current national consumption and increase savings in the
life cycle ndel because of cross—cohort differences in marginal consumption
propensities.
Hidden economic surpluses of this type can be quite sizeable relative to
officially reported deficits.Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1982) estimate that the
1981 U.S. Tax Act imposed an implicit tax, in the form of a 1981 capital loss to
holders of the U.S. capital stock of roughly $260 billion.Hadthegovernment
explicitly imposed this wealth tax, reported tax receipts would have risen by
approximately$260 billion, and the government would have reported a $202—70—
billion surplus for 1981.Such a change in the reported 1981 deficit not-
withstanding, real policy would have remained unchanged had the government also
redistributed the $260 billion tax on stock holders in a non—distorting fashion
to young and future generations according to the benefits that would otherwise
have accrued to them under the implicit surplus policy.
The estimated $260 billion capital loss assumes zero marginal costs of
adjusting the econonJ's capital stock, i.e., zero costs to physically installing
new capital or training workers to use new capital.The assumption of substan-
tial adjustment costs is likely to reduce this $260 billion figure by roughly
one quarter (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1983c).The relationship between invest-
ment and stock market valuation dates from the "q" theory of Tobin (1969).
Papers by Andrew Abel (1979)andFuinio Hayashi (1982) analyze the firm's optimal
investment strater in the presence of adjustment costs, producing a simple
linear relationship between a firm's investment rate and q. when adjustment costs
are quadratic.James Poterba's (1980) study of housing investment appears to be
the first inclusion of taxation in the q investment model.Summers (1981) and
Michael Salinger and Summers (1983) employ this partial equilibrium model to
study the impact of corporate and personal taxation on investment in plant and
equipment.
The general equilibrium implication of this research is that, apart from
policies such as investment incentives that have a direct depressing affect on
stock values, fiscal policies that increase (decrease) national capital for-
mation will likely be associated with temporary increases (decreases) in stock
market values; such capital revaluations arise because capital that has already—71—
been installed is a Quasi—fixed factor that earns intramarginal rents on its
ability to aid in the installation of additional capital.As indicated, even in
the case of investment incentives, the presence of adjustment costs can signifi-
cantly mitigate the fall in stock values associated with tax policies which
discriminate against old capital.In a life cycle nDdel the income effects of
asset revaluation arising from adjustment costs appear to lengthen fiscal policy
transitions as well as reduce the size of short—run changes in nrst economic
variables; however, their impact on long—run outcomes appears minor (Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1982)).The slower transitions reflect not only the adjustment costs
of varying capital stocks over a short period of time, but also the intergenera-
tional income affects of the capital gains and losses associated with the short
term asset revaluation.
B.Empirical Research on Savings and Intergenerational Transfers
Time series analysis of the effect of intergenerational transfers on aggre-
gate consumption has proved inconclusive.Estimates of the impact of unfunded
social security on consumption vary from very large positive effects (Feldstein,
19Th) to negative effects (Selig Lesnoy and Dean Leimer,
If one takes the life cycle ndel as the maintained
studies, the econometrics is plagued by special problems
simultaneity, misspecification, and errors in neasuring
tional transfers, such as Social Security wealth (Samuel
Jones, 1983).The standard procedure ignores difference
consumption propensities, producing coefficients of the
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coefficients.There is—72—
no reason to suspect the weights will be constant through time.The simuLta-
neity problem arises from the inclusion of aggregate disposable income as an
explanatory variable that is presumed exogeneous from current consumption.
Misspecification arises from using disposable total income, rather than the
after—tax present value of future labor earnings as an explanatory variable.In
addition, even at the cohort level, the specified coefficients are not, in
general, constant; rather they are variables that depend on the anticipated time
paths of future tax rates and benefit levels, and such anticipations change
through time.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983c) demonstrate the problem of the time series
statistical approach for the life cycle xmdel by running the standard time
series specification on simulated data that conform perfectly to this theory's
predictions concerning the impact of unfunded social security on savings.The
coefficients on the critical social security wealth variable as well as many
other variables are extraordinarially sensitive to the choice of sample period
as well as the speed with which unfunded social security is phased into the
econon; the social security coefficients ranged from 10.8 to This exer-
cise suggests that the conventional time series approach has very little power
with respect to rejecting the strict (no altruism) life cycle ndel of saving.
In addition, even if one improved the econometric specification and estimated
the equation with instrumental variables, the absence of cohort—specific time
series data appears to preclude resolving problems of aggregation.
Surprisingly, there seems to have been no attempts to use time series data
to reject the alternative hypothesis, namely that of intergenerational altruism.—T3—
This model, whichin its simplest formulation reduces to the case of a single
infinitely lived household, is more suited to aggregate data and hasthe
following testable implications.First, the econoII's stocks of human and non-
human wealth (discounted at pre—tax rates of return) should have identical pre—
dicted effects on aggregate consumption (assuming human wealth can be properly
measured, which is particularly difficult given the potential degree of uncer-
tainty concerning earnings), and the present value of the stream of future
government consumption should have an equal negative effect (see equation (11)).
Second, the distribution of resource ownership by age should have no impact on
aggregate consumption; changes in the distribution of resource ownership byage
couldbe proxied by changes in the ratio of the value of the stock market to the
value of human resources, since the elderly own a greater fraction of equities
thantheydo of human wealth.22
Cross section analyses have also been hampered by limited data; in addi-
tion, many studies, including those of the author, proceed without clearly for—
mulating reectable bypotheses concerning altruism.These particular studies
involve regressions of household private wealth on social security tax and
transfer variables.The central question posed in much of this literature is
whether households reduce their private asset accumulation when young because of
the anticipation of receiving net windfall transfers when old.The evidence
here is mixed, but even if each of these studies hadstrongly confirmedthe pro-
position that expected future windfalls lead to higher current consumption and,
therefore, less private wealth accumulation, the results would still leave unre-
solved the issue of intergenerational altruism; the altruistic hypothesis, like—T —
thelife cycle hypothesis, suggests that increases in the future resources of a
particular household should raise that household's consumption and lower its own
savings.23In the altruistic case, however, the future windfall to the household
in question would presumably also raise the consumption of all other altruisti-
cally linked households in the extended family.Unfortunately, this latter pro-
position is not tested in the existing literature, nor does it appear capable of
being tested given current data sources.If one had data on the consumption and
resources of potentially altruistically linked households, one could test for
such linkages by examining whether the consumption of one household depended on
the resources of the other.
To swnmarize, the empirical literature on intergenerational transfers has
focused very narrowly on the predicted impact of particular policies, primarily
Social Security.Many of the broader implications of selfish, finite horizon
behavior or altruistic, infinite horizon ndels have not yet been directly
tested.Blinder, Gordon, and Donald Wise (1981) is a notable exception.This
paper tests the fundamental prediction of the life cycle cdel thatthe elderly
have larger marginal propensities to consume goods and leisure than the young.
The evidence presented is weakly supportive of this proposition.
C.Intergenerational Tax Policy —SimulationAnalyses
Presumablyasa consequence of standard accounting conventions much of the
concern about intergenerational transfers has focused on the impact of"official
deficits" on investment, economic growth, and interest rates.As stressed in
section III, whether officially reported current deficits are associated in life
cycle ndels with actual intergenerational redistribution requires close scru-—75—
tinyof changes in household life time budget constraints.Conventionally
reported deficits can certainly coincide with real economic deficits; holding
other fiscal policies constant, short—run tax cuts, leading to the accumulation
of debt, the interest on which is paid for by higher future taxes (rather than
reduced government consumption) provide one example in which a higher reported
official deficit is associated with a real redistribution of resources across
generations.
The simulation nodel outlined in section IV produces the following effects
of temporary tax cuts followed by a policy of maintaining constant the
government's resulting accumulated stock of official debt.The baseline tax
regime involves a 15 percent proportional income tax.A one—year cut in the
income tax rate from 15 to 10 percent (a 5percentof GNP deficit) has no signi-
ficantimpact on the econon in the long run.This debt policy lowers the long
runcapitalstock by slightly less than 2 percent and reduces the before tax
wage by close to .5percent.The long runincometax rate is 15.3 percent, the
rateneeded to finance the interest payments on the endogeneously accumulated
stock of debt as well pay for government consumption.Interestingly, the long
run path to a "crowded out" capitalstock involves short run"crowding in" of
capital.In year 1 of the transition when the income tax rate is 10 percent,
labor supply increases by 3.7percentwhile consumption rises by only 1.7 per-
cent.The increase in income exceeds the increase in consumption producing a 32
percent increase in the saving rate in year 1 relative to the initial steady
state.In year 2 of the transition the income tax rate is raised to 15.2 per-
cent to avoid a further increase in the stock of per capita debt; labor supply—76—
nowfalls below its inital steady state valueas does the saving rate.In com-
parison with the long runeffectsof this policy, the immediate effects are
quite striking.Sizeable substitution effects from temporary lifecycle wage
changes have been estimated by Thomas MaCurdy (1981)and are also suggested by
Hausnian's ((%I)cross—sectionalevidence.This exaxiple, in which the saving
rate first rises, then falls, indicates that shortrun "supply side" responses
may bequite poor predictors oflong run supplies of capital and labor and of
thesizeof the long run tax base.
A twenty year income tax cut from 15to 10 percent has much more dramatic
long run effects; the decline in capitalacross steady states in this case is 149
percent, with every dollar of long run debt associatedwith 1.2 dollars less in
long run capital.The pre—tax wage ultimately declines by i14percent in the
simulation, while the after tax wage falls by 30percent reflecting, in part,
the 30 percent income tax rate required for longrun budget balance.The long
run real interest rate rises by 14percentagepoints in this experiment.
The year 1 response in the twentyyear tax cut simulation involves a 2.5
percent increase in labor supply, buta 2.6 percent rise in private consumption.
Consequently national savingper worker falls and crowding out beginsinyear 1.
The crowding out process is, however,quite slow; in the first ten years the per
capital capital stock falls by less than 2percent; it falls by an additional 14
percentbetween years 10 and 20.In the subsequent decade after the income tax
is raised, which induces a substitutionawayfromlabor supply and saving, there
is an additional 114 percent decline inper capita capital relative to its ini-
tial value.Thus less than one half of the total dropin capital per person—71'—
occursduring the first 30 years of the perfect foresight economic transition.
By year 60 about four—fifths of the transition is complete.
The short run differences in these two tax cut simulations clearly reflect
the predominance of substitution over income effects in the case of the short
period tax cuts and the converse for the 20 year tax cut; in the case of the one
year tax cut all but the oldest generation alive in the first year will .face
higher tax rates through the rest of their lives.Young generations will face
the higher tax rates for such a long period of time that their budget possibili-
ties and levels of welfare are actually reduced.While the income effects
experienced by most current a€e groups from the change in the time path of tax
rates in the one year tax cut are trivial, if not negative, the substitution
effect leading to less current consumption and more current labor supply at the
time of the tax cut are non—trivial.A key lesson of these two simulations is
that policiesthatinevitably crowd out saving and investment can look quite
effectiveinpromoting capital formation if one evaluates such policies using
only the first few years of information.
It is instructive to compare these results arising from presumably expli-
citly reported deficits with those arising from the unreported deficits imbedded
in unfunded Social Security.Starting out from the same initial equilibrium,
introducing a "pay as you go" Social Security system with a 0 percent replace-
ment rate and financed by payroll taxes leads to a 19 percent long run decline
In capital per person and a 5percentdrop in the pre—tax wage.Hence, in its
ability to crowd out capital in this life cycle model, introducing an unfunded
Social Security system with a substantial benefit replacement rate can have as—T8—
deleteriousan impactoncapital formation as officiallyreported economic defi-
citpolicies formation arising from multi—year tax cuts.
Theimportanceof considering unreported intergenerational transfers is
further highlighted by a final simulation experiment.Suppose the econoliw's
initial fiscal policy is a 15 percent income tax with 100 percent expensing of
new capital.As argued above, this tax structure involves no marginal taxation
of capital income, and increases in the capital income tax simply produce capi-
tal losses for elderly owners of capital, with large marginal consumption pro-
pensities, thus transferring resources to young and future generations, with low
or zero current marginal consumption propensities.Consider a permanent
increase in the tax rate on capital income from 15 to 50 percent coupled with a
20 year cut in the wage tax rate from 15 to 10 percent.While the government
reportsofficial deficits in the first few years of the economic transition in
excess of 4 percent of GNP, the unreported economic surplus associated with the
asset revaluation crowds in rre capital than the wage tax cut crowds out.By
the twentieth year of the transition the increase in the government's tax base
has sufficed to retire the official debt issued in the early years of this
policy, and the government finds itself running a very sizeable surplus.To
balance its budget after 20 years the wage tax rate must be cut; the new long
runwagetax rate is only 2 percent.The long runpercapita capital stock is
TO percent larger than its initial steady state value, and the government
(stock) surplus equals close to 7percentof private wealth.
These results illustrate the variety of outcomes, many of which are quite
surprising, that the standard CES life cycle nodel can produce in response to—79—
intergenerational tax policies.They should, however, be viewed cautiously;
augmenting this type of model with liquidity constraints on unsecured borrowing,
as in Dolde and Tobin (1981) can significantly diminish the simulated response
to such policies in life cycle economies.
VII.The Savings Impact of Intragenerational Tax Policy
Recent papers by James Heckman (1981), Hausman (1979, 1977), and Diamond
and Hausman (1983) suggest a great deal of heterogeneity in household prefer-
ences.While these and other articles carefully model taste differences, vir-
tually all applied micro econometric studies successfully employ demographic and
related variables to "control" for differences in household behavior.This evi-
dence, as well as casual observation, suggests a within cohort distribution of
time preference rates and, therefore, of differences in marginal propensities to
consmne goods and leisure.For the issue of savings and intragenerational
redistribution, the inortant empirical question is whether transfer recipients
within an age group have, on average, greater marginal propensities to dissave
out of transfers than their contemporaries who are the source of such transfers.
Since the intent of intragenerational transfers is presumably to improve the lot
of the poor, attention has naturally focused on the correlation of spending pro-
pensities with levels of economic resources.Blinder (1975), using aggregate
time series data finds that equalizing incomes is more likely to stimulate than
retard savings.On the other hand, Menchik and David's (1983) study as well as
that of Diamond and Hausne.n (1983) supports a view that marginal spending pro-
pensities decline with economic resources.
Even if the poor do not systematically differ from the rich in their inter——80—
temporalpreferences, the poor xr.y be liquidity constrained at the margin; i.e.,
they may face different shadow prices for intertemporal consumption than the
rich.Other within cohort differences in intertemporal relative prices could,
however, be offsetting.For example, under a progressive income tax the poor
face lower marginal taxes on capital income and, through this channel, lower
relative prices of future consumption and leisure.
There is mounting evidence that liquidity constraints are binding for lower
income households.Diamond (1977) and Diainand and Hausman (1983) stress the low
levels of liquid wealth held by a significant fraction of the middle and low
income population.Kotlikoff and Summers (1982) demonstrate that the timing of
the receipt of lifetime resources significantly influences tterns of lifetime
wealth accumulation.Hurd and Boskin (l981) present evidence that retirement
probabilities depend on the level of tangible wealth.Hall and Mishkin
(1982) test the Euler conditions of unconstrained intertemporal maximization and
conclude that such a model is inappropriate for roughly 20 percent of U.S.
households.King and Dicks—Mireaux (1982) reach a similar conclusion using
Canadian data.Hayashi's (1982b) focuses directly on the issue of liquidity
constraints.His novel approach is to see whether the consumption function of
presumably unconstrained households systematically differs from that of
constrained households.Hayashi's answer is strongly in the affirmative.Over
half of the households in his sample of the 19631961 Federal Reserve Survey of
Financial Characteristics meet his definition of potentially liquidity con-
strained; this group reported receiving close to 140 percent less in disposable
income than the unconstrained group.While this group as a whole appears to be—8i—
consuningonly about 3 percent less than they would in the absence of such con—
straints, for the 18 to 33yearold constrained households, actual consumption
is close to 10 percent less than predicted unconstrained consumption.
Emily Gilde (1983) examines the long run, general equilibrium savings
impact of intragenerational transfers in a 55periodlife cycle idel with exo—
genous labor supply, a utility function that is additively separable and iso—
elastic in consumption, and a Cobb Douglas production function.The model
contains two sets of agents, low earners and high earners.The populations of
each group are identical.The high earners have time preference rates of 1.5
uniform lump sum tax on rich workers of the same generation during each of his
(her) working years reduces the stock of wealth by less thanpercent in the
case of no liquidity constraints and less than 7percentwhen liquidity
constraints are binding.The finding of rather small savings effects of
redistributing to the poor appear to be quite robust in the face of reasonable
variations in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, but
they are rather sensitive to the ratio of rich to poor workers.
percent while the low earners have rates of 6percent.Thus
larger marginal consumption propensities than high earners.
the impact of within cohort transfers, Gilde considers cases
both are and are not liquidity constrained.Gilde finds tha
levels of intragenerational redistribution have rather minor
econoxr-'s long run stock of wealth.For example, a uniform
each poor worker during each of his (her) working years that
worker's lifetime resources by close to 25 percent and which
low earners have
In examining
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.The explanation for these small changes in the case of no liquidity
constraints is simply that neither the differences in marginal consumption pro-
pensities across the two groups nor the size of the transfers are sufficiently
large to have much impact on the econonw's total wealth accumulation.In the
case the poor are liquidity constrained, their marginal consumption propensities
are unity, but the resource increment multiplying there unitary propensities is
only the current year's transfers.For rich, unconstrained young workers ma1'ing
the transfers, their reduction in current consumption equals their much smaller
nrginal propensity to consume multiplied by the present value of the annual
transfers, typically a much larger number than simply the current year payment.
A.Fiscal Policy and the Government's Implicit Provision of Insurance
Interpreting fiscal policy as implicit provision of insurance is
illustrated by the following simple example.Imagine an econoxy in which each
identical risk averse agent owns a home worth $10,000 and faces an exogenous 10
percent probability of losing his home through fire.Assume the probability
of' having a fire is independent across households and that exactly 10 percent
of all houses in the economy burn down each year.In such a setting a com-
petitive insurance market, absent transaction costs, would fully insure each
homeowner, arid the fire insurance premium would be $1,000.Now suppose
the government passes a law taxing each household $1,000.At the same time
the government announces a relief program for households hit by fire which pays
$10,000 to each affected household.Obviously, this fiscal policy replicates
and would replace private provision of fire insurance.If the government tax is
set at $500 rather than $1,000,and the relief payment is $5,000 rather than—83—
$10,000,private insurers would find a ready market for $5,000 of additional
fire insurance at a competitive premium of $500.Ratherthan under-insuring the
private sector, the government might over—insure by placing a $2,000 tax on each
household and providing $20,000 in housing relief payments.In this case the
private market would respond by selling insurance against not having a fire;
i.e., the original full insurance equilibrium is restored by having each house-
hold pay a premium of $9,000 for a policy that pays zero in case of fire and
$1,000 in case of no fire.
This example illustrates two points.First, fiscal policies could, except
for their accounting labels, constitute insurance markets.Second, such
implicit insurance provision may have no impact whatsoever on the econon
because equivalent private insurance is available at the margin.
This result does not hinge on the assumption of no risk in the aggregate
econort.Assume for example thatwithequal probability either 10 percent or 20
percent of all homes will burn.In this case the competitive market premium for
$10,000 of fire protection is $1,500 with a $500 surcharge in thecase 20 per-
cent of the houses ignite and a $500 rebate in the case only 10 percent catch
fire.The government could obviously replicate this outcome by imposing a
$2,000 head tax in a bad year (20 percent of houses catch fire) anda $1,000
head tax in a good year (10 percent of houses catch fire).These funds would,
of course, be used to finance the $10,000 relief payments to fire victims.As
in the case of no econon—wide risk, over or under provision of insurance by the
government in these two states of nature will be fully offset by perfect private
insurance markets to the extent such markets exist._814 —
Tosee the connection between this example and capital income taxation,
think of this same economy as having two assets, A and B.A pays $10,000 if 20
percent of the houses, including one's own, burn down and nothing if only 10
percent of the houses burn down.B jays $11,000 if 10 percent of the houses
burn, including one's own, and zero if 20 percent are destroyed.If the price
of both assets is $i,ooothenan agent who purchases each of these assets will
end up with the same fire protection previously described.
Now assume the government places a 50 percent tax on the gross return to
each asset.Hence, if 20 percent of the houses, including one's own, catch fire
the government collects $5,000 from each affected agent on his return of
asset A.Similarly, the government's receipts per affected agent when only 10
percent of the houses burn down, including one's own, equals $5,500.Next
assume that these receipts are returned to each affected agent in the two states
of nature in the form of a lump sum subsidy.If each agent responds to this
fiscal policy by simply continuing to purchase the two assets, he will end
up in exactly the same situation as if the government had not imposed the capi-
tal income tax cum lump sum subsidy; i.e., if 20 percent of the houses catch
fire, each agent whose house burns is left with $8,000, corresponding to an after
tax return of $5,000, on asset A, plus the government subsidy of $5,000, less
the $2,000 initial investment.If only 10 percent of the houses burn down, each
agent whose house burns ends up with $9,000, representing $5,500 earned after
tax on asset B plus a $5,500 government subsidy, less the $2,000 investment.
Obviously, there is nothing in this result about taxing the returns to
assets A and B that necessarily relates to the number of fires.One could just—85—
asveil consider assets A and B as paying off contingent upon some other event
or set of events, such as the weather, changes in demand conditions, etc.As
Gordon (1981) emphasizes the assumption that the government's revenue is handed
back to the agents in a lump sum is also not critical to the result that capital
income taxation could effectively represent superfluous government risk pooling
in capital and insurance i.rkets that has no independent effect on the econon.
Rather than returning the capital income tax revenues to the private sector,
suppose the government spends these receipts on consumption.One can, for con—
venience, think of the government as handingtherevenues out as a lump sum sub-
sidy and then retrieving them through a separate lump sum tax to pay for its
consumption.In this case the replacement of capital income taxation by lump
sum taxation leaves the econos' unaffected, since the private market, by assump-
tion, steps in to provide the risk pooling that was previously arising under the
capital income tax.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) dennstrate that wage taxation, in the presence of
earnings uncertainty, can analogously be viewed as government provision of human
capital insurance.Social Security's provision of annuity, disability, and life
insurance through its benefit structure is fairly obvious, and Social Security
"taxes" could easily be relabelled insurance premia for the purchase of these
policies.At first glance, however, many of Social Security's provisions appear
at odds with efficient insurance provision.Social Security's earnings test for
receipt of benefits is one example.Diamond and Mirrless (19T8), on the other
hand, argue that this provision is plausibly a component of optimally con-
figured government insurance against the risk of old age disability in cases—86—
wheredisability is very difficult to verify.Just as fire insurance pays of f
only to those experiencing a fire, the earnings test makes sure that only those
who aren't working (or aren't working imach), presumably the disabled, are the
only elderly to receive benefits.Merton (1981) develops one of the more inge-
nious of these arguments that fiscal policy is a veil for government insurance.
In his model the government combines both unfunded social security and a con-
sumptiontax to pool human capital risk and non—human capital risk optimally
across young and oldgenerations.214
Inassessing the savings impact of these potential forms of government
insurance provisions, the key question appears to be the extent to which the
private market would otherwise provide each particular form of insurance.Since
capital markets, at least in developed countries, appear to offer substantial
risk sharing opportunities, it appears unlikely that eliminating capital income
taxation would significantly alter the pooling of risky returns to non—human
capital.This conclusion seems much less plausible in the case of human capital
risk.Ignoring possible risk pooling within families and firms, there are no
private markets in which one can sell off a portion of his or her future ear—
flings and purchase that of others.
Assuming that the government is the sole effective insurer of human capi-
tal, the savings impact of this insurance is assessed by considering an alter-
native hypothetical state of no human capital insurance.Articles by Leland
(1968), Sandmo (1970), Bruce Miller (19Th, 1976), and Skinner (1983) suggest
that increased earnings uncertainty is likely to lead risk averse agents to
reduce their current consumption and leisure holding the expected level of ear——87—
flings constant.In addition, earnings risk that is specifically related to the
returnsfrom training mayinhibithuman capital formation, leading to less
trainingand more labor supply when young.This implies a steeper ageconsump-
tion profile and flatter age earnings profile, on average, in the econon than
would occur with earnings insurance.This suggests more savings in the no
insurance stochastic steady state.Estimates of the extent of such differences
in long run wealth stocks would contribute both to understand—ing how potential
government earnings insurance as well as government—generated earnings uncer-
tainty associated with random taxation (Weiss, 1976;Stiglitz,1982; Eaton 1981;
Skinner 1983b) affects savings.
There are now a number of articles dealing with saving behavior in the
absence of private annuity insurance.Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) is the first
analysis of the pure insurance effects of government pensions on national
saving.They demonstrate that when private arrangements for pooling the uncer-
tainty of longevity are unavailable, the government's provision of fully funded
old age annuities alters household consumption possibilities.In their model in
which agents have a bequest motive, the short—run saving impact of such provi-
sion is ambiguous.Hubbard (1983) points t that this provision unambiguously
reduces national saving if agents have no bequest motive.A fuller description
oflifecycle (zero bequest motive) economies, in the absence of annuity
insurance, is presented in Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1983) and Abel
(1983).Bothpapers independently derived the stochastic steady state proper-
ties of economies in which agents involuntarily leave bequests to their
children.Abel also considers the effects of introducing afullyfunded social—88—
securitysystem in such an econon, his chief finding being that such a policy
reduces savings.A related article by Kotlikoff, Shoven and Spivak (1983) corn—
pares the long run stock of wealth prevailing in economies with and without per-
fect annuity insurance.In the latter type of economies there is partial
insurance provided by family members; older family members selfishly trade title
to their equally selfish children for support if they live longer than average.
In contrast to the perfect insurance steady state, these authors find that
wealth in the stochastic steady state can be significantly higher in an econon
with imperfect family annuity insurance.Their estimates suggest that social
security's provison of annuity insurance is potentially as important as its
method of finance in reducing wealth accumulation.
IX.Policy Announcements and Policy Perceptions —
TheProblem of Dynamic Inconsistency
Sections IV through VII analyzed the impact of new tax policies assuming
such policies take "rational" agents by surprise and that the public fully
believes these policies will be implemented through time.The proposition that
"rational"agents can systematically be"takenbysurprise" sounds, andis,a
contradiction in terms.Fischer (1979) nicely illustrates the problem of inter—
temporal change in government policy; he points out that rational agents who are
cognizant of the government's future objectives will be able to predict future
policy changes.Thus an announced program to stimulate saving may have
the opposite effect on private behavior if the public conjectures that once
additional wealth has been accumulated the government in power will find this a
convenient source of explicit or implicit revenues.Stated differently, a—89—
currentwealth tax would depress current consumption and leisure and raise
saving if households believe such a tax will not be imposed again in the future.
The alternative perception of continued future wealth taxes translates into very
high implicit present prices of future consumption and leisure and leads house-
holds to substitute toward current consumption and leisure.
Of course the public sector nay be incapable of accurately predicting
future fiscal policy.If such were the case, one would expect (especially in a
neoclassical setting with well functioning capital markets) the private sector
to take steps to self insure against changes in government fiscal policy, in
particular against inter— and intragenerational redistribution.
Indeed, if the econon consisted of a large number of households with
Barro—type intertemporal preferences (equation(114)) these families could con-
ceivably write binding contracts to hedge themselves through eternity against
intra—marginal redistribution.If one further assumed that all such families
were interlinked through marital ties, they couldconceivably share the same
altruistic objective function.In this case they would fully internalize the
government's budget constraint and treat all government taxes as lump sum levies
no matter how they were levied.Thus the government would be powerless to alter
the set of marginal prices entering household budgets.Finally, if this house-
hold sector viewed government consumption as a perfect substitute for private
consumption, changes in government consumption would also have no impact on the
econonw.In such a hypothetical econon the government's fiscal policy has no
influence whatsoever on national saving.
This example and the prior discussion is obviously extreme, but it high——90—
lights the fact that nDstneoclassicalstudies of savings andtaxationappear
implicitly to assume away the existence of particular insurance markets and/or
the ability of otherwise rational agents to learn from the past in considering
the government's impact on their future.
X.Concluding Comments
Economics is nest exciting when it challenges conventional views; it is
ultimately most persuasive in relating theory to fact when the theory is based
on fundamental notions of optimization, and it is nst important when it
addresses macro relationships.Recent neoclassical analyses of taxation and
earnings are exciting, persuasive, and important.In constrast to conventional
notions, properly designed fical policy can have clear and powerful savings
affects in nest neoclassical nDdels.Efficacious application of such policies
appears as much a question of choice and timing of changes in fiscal instruments
as it is a question of exact values of preference parameters.In addition, the
extent of market and family credit and insurance arrangements is critical for
determining the savings impact of policy; fiscal instruments may, themselves,
constitute government insurance provision.Alternatively, frequent, unexpected
changes in these instruments may be a major source of private uncertainty.
The findings of recent research provide important lessons for the conduct
of fiscal policy.First, this research warns that official reporting of fiscal
policy can be highly misleading, with economic deficits (surpluses) reportedas
surpluses (deficits) and effective marginal subsidization officially reportedas
positive taxation.Second, in the presence of certain policy instruments,
changes in other instruments can have exactly the opposite affect intended and—91--
nornnily presumed (e.g., lowering capital income tax rates in the presence of
100percentexpensing).Third, short run impacts of fiscal policy may be
exactly the opposite of long run impacts, suggesting that policy assessment
based only on current outcomes may be highly missleading.Fourth, although the
precise amount of "crowding out" associated with economic deficits remains unre-
solved, the potential major reductions in national wealth associated with expli-
cit and implicit economic deficits make such policies very riskl,y gambles for
future generations.Fifth, from the perspective of neoclassical ntdels, fre-
quent changes in policy instruments appear undesirable; once the private sector
begins to anticipate fiscal revisions, it will attempt to insure against such
changes, reducing the effectiveness of policy, if not reversing the direction of
its intended impact.Finally, both the insurance and risk generating properties
of fiscal policy are important, if not primary considerations in policy design.
As in other fields of economics, theoretical advances in taxation and
savings have outpaced the acquisition of data of sufficient detail to discrimi-
nate among theories.Resolution of questions as hasic as the burden of the
debt turns on quite subtle types of behavior, such as the extent of mutual
caring within families, that will require new data to fully discern.Private
beliefs about precise future government policies, while difficult to ascertain,
are crucial determinants of current incentives to work and save.Such beliefs
need to be identified as part of any empirical assessment of the impact of par-
ticular fiscal measures.There are other deeper questions that will make
savings and taxation an exciting field for years to come.The xxst fundamental
question is surely the applicability of the neoclassical paradigm to actual—92-
household savings behavior.There is as yet no convincing empirical evidence
and certainly no professional concensus that households make saving decisions in
accordance with the dictates of neoclassical optimization.The assumption of
continuous equilibrium, particularly in labor markets, and the extensive infor-
mation processing requirements of certainty as well as uncertainty modelsare
two characteristics of neoclassical models that raise frequent objections.
These and other concerns about the neoclassical framework recommend caution both
in assessing the extensive recent research in neoclassical savings and in
relying on these findings in the actual setting of fiscal policy.—93—
Footnotes
1.This is strictly true only in partial equilibrium, i.e,. holding pre—tax
factor returns and producer prices constant.
2.Bennett McCallum (1982) demonstrates that the government's budget constraint
holds under a weaker condition than that assumed here.In particular the
constraint holds even if debt indefinitely grows at a faster rate than the
econoxv provided that rate is less than the long run real return to
capital.
3.John Musgrave provided the BEA data used in these calculations.Imputed
rent is defined here as depreciation (estimated by the BEA) plus
beginning of year assets, measured in current dollars, times the average
annualized three month Treasury bill rate less the annual percentage
change in the Consumer Price Index.
4.Davidand Scadding (19Th) suggest that the private sector may use
"taxes", as defined and reported by the National Income and Product
Account, to measure current government consumption.In this case the
gross private saving rate equals the perceived gross national saving
rate, and its constancy, assuming a roughly stable economic environment
as well as stable preferences, suggests that perceived government con—
sumption substitutes perfectly and intramarginally for private consumption.
As Michael Boskin (1978)pointsout, however, "ultrarational" households
presumably take account of the depreciation of the econozv's physical9)4 —
capitalin making economic choices.Table 1 indicates that the net
national saving rate, which accounts for depreciation,has been anything
but constant since 1950.
5.DavidBradford made this observation ina conversation with the author.
6.Thedecision to label prospective expenditures "officialliabilities" has
real effects to the extent that it alters theprobability that such expendi-
tures will be made.While the default risk may be smaller forofficial than
for unofficial, implicit liabilities,the real return to official liabili-
ties may still be highly risky.In the U.S., for example, official commit-
ments to future nominal expenditures donot correspond to commitments to
future real expenditures.During the l9TOs the U.S. federal government
accrued 365.5billiondollars, measured in 1980 dollars, in realcapital
gains on its official liabilities whilenever missing a nominal principle or
interest payment.This default on the real value of officialliabilities
through inflation is documented in the 1982Economic Report of the
President, Ch. 5.
7.Thegovernment, in this case, "owns" all wealth andinvests its wealth in
the private sector each period either directlythrough government firms or
indirectly through government loans to privatefirms and individuals.For
neutrality, the allocation of governmentdirect and indirect investment must
correspond to what would otherwise have arisenin the absence of the
"surplus".In this example the governmenteffectively acts like the private
sector's bank, since private sectorwealth is simply funneled through the
government's hands and invested backin the econon.The "taxes", Tare,—95—
ineffect, loans to the government, and the "spending",'represents
repayment of principalplus interest.Just as positive "taxes" may consti-
tute private loans to the government, negative "taxes" may be equivalent to
government loans to the private sector. For example, accelerated depre-
ciation allowances and other investment incentives at the early stages of an
investment prospect, coupled with positive taxation of investment returns at
later stages, can, apart from their impact on marginal incentives, be viewed
as government loans to the private sector.The repayment of these "loans" is
paid in the form of "capital income taxes."
8.Forexample, a household's welfare and Social Security benefit payments,
before any reduction for earnings, are treated as lump sum tax credits; and
the schedule of potential losses of these benefits because of labor earnings
is added to other marginal labor tax and subsidy schedules facing the house-
hold (more precisely specific household members) in year t to produce a
total net labor earnings tax schedule.This schedule is applied to house-
hold i's actual earnings to calculate total taxes on labor earnings in year
t by household j. Similarly, the government's year t payments of interest
and principal on netofficial debt held by household jaresubtracted from
other net intramarginal taxes to determine household j's total net lump sum
tax in year t.Effective (net) capital income tax rate schedules
confronting each household in each future year are determined by comparing
before—tax returns earned on ahousehold's marginal investment with the
after—tax (including corporate and personal tax) return received by that—96—
household(Alan Auerbach and Dale Jorgenson (1980)).
9.Formost fiscal programs the relationship between their provisionsand these
fundamental policy instruments is easily discerned.For other policies the
connection is extremely subtle.Section VI, for example, describes how
government investment incentives redistributeresources from older to
younger cohorts not through the explicit collection and transfer ofresources,
but by lowering stock market values.Another example, pointed out by
Michael Boskin (1.982), are government regulations governing thecharac-
teristics of particular commodities; a rule that n.ndates automobileseat
belts in new cars can effectively be equivalent to the government'slevying
a tax on the purchase of each automobile, and spending (consuming) these
revenues on safety belts for each new automobile.
10. This statement and the subsequent discussion ignores differentialrates
of taxation of the same factor across industries andassumes constant
pre—tax factor returns and producer prices.
11. Subsituting for Gt
from (10) into (ii) gives the private sector's
t0 l+r
budget constraint with quantities multiplied by before—tax prices.
12.Note that in the case of' a capital income tax,
Tr'the present value of
revenues is Tr r(E1—c1)/(1+r), where E1—C1isfirst period saving, and
r(E1—C1) is capital income in period 2.The household budget constraint,
=_*1+11_trflcan be written as, E1—Trr(El_C*)/(1+r)—
C1 C2 /1+r.In figure 2 C2equals the verticle distance BC1 ,andtheslope of line 2, 1+r, divided by the length BC1equals the horizontal
distance E1—G1—C1 ,i.e.,E1—G1—C1=C2/1+r.Hence the distance G1, in
the diagram measures the present value of tax receipts undereitherlump sum
or capital income taxation.
13.This equation for national wealth is unaffected by manipulations in govern-
ment accounting; for example, if the government chooses "to run a larger
surplus" by levying a lump sum tax of L1, in period 1,whichis returned
with interest as a lump sum rebate, L2, in period 2, then Wg and W1, will
respectively increase and decrease by L1, leaving national wealth, W,
unchanged.
lb.The assumption that the policy is enacted at time t+l rather than t is made
to simplify the discussion.If the policy change is enacted at time t, the
outcome is the same except the government must raise its capital income tax
rate after t to reflect the reduced accumulation of the period t young.
15.According to (ii), in partial equilibrium (i.e., holding therts constant)
the government can finance a temporary increase (decrease) in consumption
by a future decrease (increase) in consumption with no necessary change in
private consumption or leisure.
16.The capital income tax component of the income tax also involves an element
of lump sum taxation since it taxes, in part, the immediate return on
existing wealth, which is obviously predetermined (Chazniey, 1981)).
17.Section V.This crowding in of capital in the consumption tax case is con-
sistent with a reduced capital—labor ratio because labor supply rises by a
larger percentage than capital.—98-.
18..To see this note that under the stated assumptions and ignoring, for
simplicity, productivity growth, steady state private consumption, C, is
proportional, to the present value of resources over the infinite horizon,
R.Thus we can write: C =OR.The proportionality factor 0 equals
r/l+r ,wherer is the steady state interest rate.This follows from the
infinite horizon budget constraint Ec(i+r) = OR(i + r) R T0 'r=O
where C is not indexed by time because of the assumed steady state.Let
G be the permanent increase in government consumption.Then, since con-
sumptionor wage taxation are equivalent to lump sum taxationin this
steadystate,the change in private, consumption, tC, equals —O• T, where
T is the equivalent present value lump sum tax needed to financethe perma-
nent stream G, i.e., T=tOAG(i + r)_T =tG(1 +r)
•Hence,
-r =— OT=— T=Gas asserted. 1 +r
19.A more precise explanation of the redistribution toyoung and future
generationsis that theygain the government's disbursement through
time of the land rent tax revenues (since government consumption
is assumedfixed) and the higher pre-tax wages that would arise ina
closedecononv from the increased capital accumulation induced by the land
rent tax.
20.The government can be thought of hereas lending the investor T dollars
today which is returned with interest in the future in the formof positive
capital income taxes.—99—
21.•Lawrence Weiss suggested using this variable in a discussion with the
author.
22.Robert Barro pointed this out in a 1979 conversation with the author.
23.In Merton's model elderly generations pay for their receipts of positive,
but variable social security benefits by paying positive, but variable
aunts of consumption tax.Since social security's benefits are propor-
tional to earnings in Merton's model and variations in consumption tax
receipts depend, in part, on the random return to capital, these fiscal
instruments provide the elderly with a share of the econonr's human capital
risk and the young with a share of the econon's physical capital risk.—100--
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